Mission Unaccomplished: Why the Invasion of Iraq Was the Single Worst Foreign Policy Decision in American History
I was there. And “there” was nowhere. And nowhere was the place to be if you wanted to see the signs of end times for the American Empire up close. It was the place to be if you wanted to see the madness -- and oh yes, it was madness -- not filtered through a complacent and sleepy media that made Washington’s war policy seem, if not sensible, at least sane and serious enough. I stood at Ground Zero of what was intended to be the new centerpiece for a Pax Americana in the Greater Middle East.
Not to put too fine a point on it, but the invasion of Iraq turned out to be a joke. Not for the Iraqis, of course, and not for American soldiers, and not the ha-ha sort of joke either. And here’s the saddest truth of all: on March 20th as we mark the 10th anniversary of the invasion from hell, we still don’t get it. In case you want to jump to the punch line, though, it’s this: by invading Iraq, the U.S. did more to destabilize the Middle East than we could possibly have imagined at the time. And we -- and so many others -- will pay the price for it for a long, long time.
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We don’t get it. We really don’t. We may not, in military terms,
know how
to win any more, but as a society we don’t get losing either. We don’t
recognize it, even when it’s staring us in the face, when nothing --
and I mean nothing -- works out as planned. Take the upcoming 10th
anniversary of George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq as Exhibit A. You could
describe what happened in that country as an unmitigated disaster --
from the moment, in April 2003, U.S. troops first entered a Baghdad in
flames and being looted (“
stuff happens”) and were assigned to guard only the
Interior Ministry (i.e. the secret police) and the
Oil Ministry (well, you know what that is) to the moment in December 2011 when the last American combat unit
slipped out of that land in the dead of the night (after lying to Iraqi colleagues about what they were doing).
As it happened, the country that we were going to
garrison
for a lifetime (to the thankful cheers of its inhabitants) while we
imposed a Pax Americana on the rest of the region didn’t want us. The
government we essentially installed chose Iran as
an ally and
business partner. The permanent bases we built to the tune of billions of dollars are now largely
looted ghost towns. The
reconstruction
of the country that we promoted proved worse than farcical, as former
State Department official Peter Van Buren, author of the already classic
book
We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People,
reminds us. And an outfit proudly carrying the al-Qaeda brand name,
which did not exist in Iraq before our invasion, is now thriving in a
still destabilized country. Consider that just the start of a much longer list.
For
Americans, however, a single issue overwhelms all of the above, one so
monumental that we can’t keep our minds off it or on much of anything
else when it comes to Iraq. I’m talking, of course, about “the surge,”
those five brigades of extra combat troops that, in 2006, a desperate
president decided to send into an occupied country collapsing in a
maelstrom of insurgency and sectarian civil war. Admittedly, General
David Petraeus, who led that surge, would later experience a farcical
disaster of his own and is in retirement after going “
all in”
with his biographer. Still, as we learned in the Senate hearings on
Chuck Hagel’s nomination as Pentagon chief, the question -- the
litmus test when it comes to Iraq --
remains:
Was the surge strategy he implemented a remarkable success or just a
simple, straightforward success in essentially buying off the Sunni
opposition and, for a period, giving the country a veneer of relative --
extremely relative -- calm? Was it responsible for allowing us to
leave behind a
shattered Iraq (and all of Washington’s shattered imperial dreams) with, as President Obama put it, our “
heads held high”?
Oh, and lest you think that only right-wing Republicans and the rest of
the crew that once cheered us into Iraq and refused to face what was
happening while we were there find the surge the ultimate measure of our
stay, check out Tom Powers’s recent admiring portrait of the surge
general in the
New York Review of Books.
Here’s
at least one explanation for our inability to look defeat in the face
and recognize it for what it is: like the proverbial horseman who
prefers not to change mounts in midstream, we have an aversion to
changing experts in mid-disaster, even when those experts have batting
averages for pure wrongness that should stagger the imagination. In
fact, you could say that the more deeply, incontrovertibly, disastrously
wrong you were about Iraq, the more likely the media was in the years
after, on one disaster “anniversary” after another, to call on you for
your opinion. At the fifth anniversary of the invasion, for example,
the New York Times
rounded up a range of "experts on military and foreign affairs" to look back. Six of them had been
intimately involved
in the catastrophe either as drumbeaters for the invasion, instigators
of it, or facilitators of the occupation that followed. Somehow, that
paper could not dig up a single expert who had actually opposed the
invasion.
In other words, we’re talking here about a country
that, for wisdom, regularly consults the walking dead, the zombies of
our Iraq experience. And don’t think that, in the coming days, some of
them won’t be back again to offer their balanced thoughts on what it all
meant. Only one kind of expert has been noticeably missing all these
years in the mainstream media when it comes to assessing our Iraq
experience: those benighted, misguided types in their millions who,
before March 2003, were foolish enough to go out
into the streets of global cities and oppose the invasion entirely.
To
inoculate you against the coverage in the anniversary week to come, and
against the spirit of our American times, TomDispatch offers Peter Van
Buren, who had a ringside seat at part of our Iraqi follies, on what
these 10 years from hell actually meant for us as well as others.
Tom
Mission Unaccomplished: Why the Invasion of Iraq Was the Single Worst Foreign Policy Decision in American History
The Madness of King George
It’s easy to forget just how normal the madness looked back then. By 2009, when I arrived in Iraq, we were already at the last-gasp moment when it came to salvaging something from what may yet be seen as the single worst foreign policy decision in American history. It was then that, as a State Department officer assigned to lead two provincial reconstruction teams in eastern Iraq, I first walked into the
chicken processing plant in the middle of nowhere.
By then, the U.S. “reconstruction” plan for that country was drowning in rivers of money foolishly spent. As the centerpiece for those American efforts -- at least after
Plan A, that our invading troops would be greeted with flowers and sweets as
liberators, crashed and burned -- we had managed to reconstruct nothing of significance. First conceived as a
Marshall Plan for the New American Century, six long years later it had devolved into farce.
In my act of the play, the U.S. spent some $2.2 million dollars to build a
huge facility in the boondocks. Ignoring the stark reality that Iraqis had raised and sold chickens locally for some 2,000 years, the U.S. decided to finance the construction of a central processing facility, have the Iraqis running the plant purchase local chickens, pluck them and slice them up with complex machinery brought in from Chicago, package the breasts and wings in plastic wrap, and then truck it all to local grocery stores. Perhaps it was the desert heat, but this made sense at the time, and the plan was supported by the Army, the State Department, and the White House.
Elegant in conception, at least to us, it failed to account for a few simple things, like a lack of regular electricity, or logistics systems to bring the chickens to and from the plant, or working capital, or... um... grocery stores. As a result, the gleaming $2.2 million plant processed no chickens. To use a few of the catchwords of that moment, it transformed nothing, empowered no one, stabilized and economically uplifted not a single Iraqi. It just sat there empty, dark, and unused in the middle of the desert. Like the chickens, we were plucked.
In keeping with the madness of the times, however, the simple fact that the plant failed to meet any of its real-world goals did not mean the project wasn't a success. In fact, the factory was a hit with the U.S. media. After all, for every propaganda-driven visit to the plant, my group stocked the place with hastily purchased chickens, geared up the machinery, and put on a dog-and-pony, er, chicken-and-rooster, show.
In the dark humor of that moment, we christened the place the
Potemkin Chicken Factory. In between media and VIP visits, it sat in the dark, only to rise with the rooster’s cry each morning some camera crew came out for a visit. Our factory was thus considered a great success.
Robert Ford, then at the Baghdad Embassy and now America's rugged shadow ambassador to Syria, said his visit was the best day out he enjoyed in Iraq.
General Ray Odierno, then commanding all U.S. forces in Iraq, sent bloggers and camp followers to view the victory project. Some of the
propaganda, which proclaimed that “teaching Iraqis methods to flourish on their own gives them the ability to provide their own stability without needing to rely on Americans,” is still
online (including this
charming image of American-Iraqi mentorship, a particular favorite of mine).
We weren’t stupid, mind you. In fact, we all felt smart and clever enough to learn to look the other way. The chicken plant was a funny story at first, a kind of insider’s joke you all think you know the punch line to. Hey, we wasted some money, but $2.2 million was a small amount in a war whose costs will someday be toted up in the
trillions. Really, at the end of the day, what was the harm?
The harm was this: we wanted to leave Iraq (and Afghanistan) stable to advance American goals. We did so by spending our time and money on obviously pointless things, while most Iraqis lacked access to clean water, regular electricity, and medical or hospital care. Another State Department official in Iraq wrote in his weekly summary to me, “At our project ribbon-cuttings we are typically greeted now with a cursory ‘thank you,’ followed by a long list of crushing needs for essential services such as water and power.” How could we help stabilize Iraq when we acted like buffoons? As one Iraqi told me, “It is like I am standing naked in a room with a big hat on my head. Everyone comes in and helps put flowers and ribbons on my hat, but no one seems to notice that I am naked.”
By 2009, of course, it should all have been so obvious. We were no longer inside the neocon dream of unrivaled global superpowerdom, just mired in what happened to it. We were a chicken factory in the desert that no one wanted.
Time Travel to 2003
Anniversaries are times for reflection, in part because it’s often only with hindsight that we recognize the most significant moments in our lives. On the other hand, on anniversaries it’s often hard to remember what it was really like back when it all began. Amid the chaos of the Middle East today, it’s easy, for instance, to forget what things looked like as 2003 began. Afghanistan, it appeared, had been invaded and occupied quickly and cleanly, in a way the Soviets (the British, the ancient Greeks…) could never have dreamed of. Iran was frightened, seeing the mighty American military on its eastern border and soon to be on the western one as well, and was
ready to deal. Syria was controlled by the stable thuggery of Bashar al-Assad and relations were so good that the U.S. was
rendering terror suspects to his secret prisons for torture.
Most of the rest of the Middle East was tucked in for a long sleep with dictators reliable enough to maintain stability. Libya was an exception, though predictions were that before too long Muammar Qaddafi would make some sort of deal. (
He did.) All that was needed was a quick slash into Iraq to establish a permanent American military presence in the heart of Mesopotamia. Our future garrisons there could obviously oversee things, providing the necessary muscle to swat down any future destabilizing elements. It all made so much sense to the neocon visionaries of the early Bush years. The only thing that Washington couldn’t imagine was this: that the primary destabilizing element would be us.
Indeed, its mighty plan was disintegrating even as it was being dreamed up. In their lust for everything on no terms but their own, the Bush team
missed a diplomatic opportunity with Iran that might have rendered today’s saber rattling unnecessary, even as Afghanistan fell apart and Iraq imploded. As part of the breakdown, desperate men, blindsided by history, turned up the volume on desperate measures: torture, secret gulags, rendition, drone killings, extra-constitutional actions at home. The sleaziest of deals were cut to try to salvage something, including ignoring the
A.Q. Khan network of Pakistani nuclear proliferation in return for a cheesy Condi Rice-Qaddafi
photo-op rapprochement in Libya.
Inside Iraq, the forces of Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict had been unleashed by the U.S. invasion. That, in turn, was creating the conditions for a
proxy war between the U.S. and Iran, similar to the growing proxy war between Israel and Iran inside
Lebanon (where another destabilizing event, the
U.S.-sanctioned Israeli invasion of 2006, followed in hand). None of this has ever ended. Today, in fact, that proxy war has simply found a fresh host,
Syria, with multiple powers using “humanitarian aid” to push and shove their Sunni and Shia avatars around.
Staggering neocon expectations, Iran emerged from the U.S. decade in Iraq economically more powerful, with sanctions-busting
trade between the two neighbors now valued at some $5 billion a year and still growing. In that decade, the U.S. also managed to remove one of Iran’s strategic counterbalances, Saddam Hussein, replacing him with a government run by Nouri al-Malaki, who had once found
asylum in Tehran.
Meanwhile, Turkey is now engaged in an
open war with the Kurds of northern Iraq. Turkey is, of course, part of NATO, so imagine the U.S. government sitting by silently while Germany bombed Poland. To complete the circle, Iraq’s prime minister recently
warned that a victory for Syria's rebels will spark sectarian wars in his own country and will create a new haven for al-Qaeda which would further destabilize the region.
Meanwhile, militarily burnt out, economically reeling from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and lacking any moral standing in the Middle East post-Guantanamo and
Abu Ghraib, the U.S. sat on its hands as the regional spark that came to be called the Arab Spring
flickered out, to be replaced by yet more destabilization across the region. And even that hasn’t stopped Washington from pursuing the
latest version of the (now-nameless) global war on terror into ever-newer regions in need of destabilization.
Having noted the ease with which a numbed American public patriotically looked the other way while our wars followed their particular paths to hell, our leaders no longer blink at the thought of sending American
drones and special operations forces ever farther afield, most notably ever deeper into
Africa, creating from the ashes of Iraq a frontier version of the state of
perpetual war George Orwell once imagined for his dystopian novel 1984. And don’t doubt for a second that there is a direct path from the invasion of 2003 and that chicken plant to the dangerous and chaotic place that today passes for our American world.
Happy Anniversary
On this 10th anniversary of the Iraq War, Iraq itself remains, by any measure, a dangerous and unstable place. Even the usually sunny Department of State
advises American travelers to Iraq that U.S. citizens “remain at risk for kidnapping... [as] numerous insurgent groups, including Al Qaida, remain active...” and notes that “State Department guidance to U.S. businesses in Iraq advises the use of Protective Security Details.”
In the bigger picture, the world is also a far more dangerous place than it was in 2003. Indeed, for the State Department, which sent me to Iraq to witness the follies of empire, the world has become ever more daunting. In 2003, at that infamous “
mission accomplished” moment, only Afghanistan was on the list of overseas embassies that were considered
“extreme danger posts.” Soon enough, however, Iraq and Pakistan were added. Today, Yemen and Libya, once boring but secure outposts for State’s officials, now fall into the same category.
Other places once considered safe for diplomats and their families such as
Syria and
Mali have been evacuated and have no American diplomatic presence at all. Even sleepy
Tunisia, once calm enough that the State Department had its Arabic language
school there, is now on reduced staff with no diplomatic family members resident.
Egypt teeters.
The Iranian leadership watched carefully as the American imperial version of Iraq collapsed, concluded that Washington was a paper tiger, backed away from initial offers to talk over contested issues, and instead (at least for a while) doubled-down on achieving nuclear breakout capacity,
aided by the past work of that same A.Q. Khan network.
North Korea, another A.Q. Khan beneficiary, followed the same pivot ever farther from Washington, while it became a genuine nuclear power. Its neighbor China pursued its own path of
economic dominance, while helping to “pay” for the Iraq War by becoming the
number-one holder of U.S. debt among foreign governments. It now owns more than 21% of the U.S. debt held overseas.
And don’t put away the joke book just yet. Subbing as apologist-in-chief for an absent George W. Bush and the top officials of his administration on this 10th anniversary, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair recently
reminded us that there is more on the horizon. Conceding that he had “long since given up trying to persuade people Iraq was the right decision,” Blair added that new crises are looming. “You’ve got one in Syria right now, you’ve got one in Iran to come,” he said. “We are in the middle of this struggle, it is going to take a generation, it is going to be very arduous and difficult. But I think we are making a mistake, a profound error, if we think we can stay out of that struggle.”
Think of his comment as a warning. Having somehow turned much of Islam into a foe, Washington has essentially assured itself of never-ending crises that it stands no chance whatsoever of winning. In this sense, Iraq was not an aberration, but the historic zenith and nadir for a way of thinking that is only now slowing waning. For decades to come, the U.S. will have a big enough military to ensure that our decline is slow, bloody, ugly, and reluctant, if inevitable. One day, however, even the drones will have to land.
And so, happy 10th anniversary, Iraq War! A decade after the invasion, a chaotic and unstable Middle East is the unfinished legacy of our invasion. I guess the joke is on us after all, though no one is laughing.
