Turkey’s Difficult Choice in Palestine, Israel
by Ramzy Baroud - PalestineChronicle.com
An Israeli-Turkish rapprochement is unmistakably underway,
but unlike the heyday of their political alignment of the1990’s, the revamped
relationship is likely to be more guarded and will pose a greater challenge to
Turkey rather than to Israel.
Israeli media referenced a report by Turkish newspaper
Radikal with much interest, regarding secret talks between Turkey and Israel
that could yield an Israeli apology for its army’s raid against the Turkish aid
flotilla, the Mavi Marmara, which was on its way to Gaza in May 2010. The
assault resulted in the death of 9 Turkish activists, including a US citizen.
The attack wrought a crisis unseen since the rise of the
Turkish-Israeli alliance starting in 1984, followed by a full blown strategic
partnership in 1996. But that crisis didn’t necessarily start at the Mavi
Marmara deadly attack, or previous Israeli insults of Turkey. Nor did it begin
with the Israeli so-called Operation Cast Lead against besieged Gaza in Dec
2008, which resulted in the death and wounding of thousands of Palestinians,
mostly civilians.
According to the Radikal report (published in Feb 20 and
cited by Israeli Haaretz two days later), Israel is willing to meet two of
Turkey’s conditions for the resumption of full ties: an apology, and
compensation to the families of the victims. “Turkey has also demanded Israel
lift the siege,” on Gaza, Haaretz reported, citing Radikal, “but is prepared to
drop that demand.”
The reports of secret talks are not new. Similar reports had
surfaced of talks in Geneva and Cairo. Turkish-Israeli reconciliation has, at
least for a while, been an important item on the US foreign policy agenda in
the Middle East, until few months ago when the US elections pushed everything
else to the backseat. But despite fiery rhetoric, the signs of a thawing
conflict are obvious. Writing in Al-Ahram Weekly on Jan. 16, Galal Nassar
attributed that Tel Aviv is working “its idiosyncratic ways to patch up what it
regarded as a passing storm cloud in its relations with its friend, and perhaps
strategic ally.” Turkey, responded in kind, in its decision “to lift its veto
against Israeli participation in non-military activities in NATO.”
Leaked news of a political settlement are not the only
headlines related to this topic. There is also the matter of military and
economic cooperation, which are even more common. According to
FlightGlobal.com, reporting on Feb. 21, the Israeli government has agreed to
the delivery of electronic support measures (ESM) equipment “to be installed on
the Turkish air force's new Boeing 737 airborne early warning and control
(AEW&C) system aircraft.”
Meanwhile, a large Turkish conglomerate Zorlu Group “has
been working in recent months to convince the Israeli government and the
Leviathan gas field partners to approve energy exports to Turkey,” TheMarker
has learned, as reported in Haaretz on Feb 14.
This is only the tip of the iceberg. If these reports are
even partially credible, Turkish-Israeli relations are being carefully, but
decidedly repaired. This stands in contrast with declared Turkish foreign
policy and the many passionate statements by Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and other leading Turkish politicians.
Following a Nov 16 Friday prayer, The New York Times
reported from Istanbul that Erdogan denied any talks between his country and
Israel regarding resolving a crisis instigated by another Israeli assault on
Gaza. He went even further, “We do not have any connections in terms of dialogue
with Israel,” he reportedly said. At a parliamentary meeting few days later, he
described Israel’s conduct in Gaza as “ethnic cleansing.”
On Nov 20, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu was in
Gaza on a solidarity visit, along with an Arab League delegation in an
unprecedented show of solidarity. In a strange contrast with the spirit of his
mission, however, “Davutoglu suggested to reporters that back-channel
discussions had been opened with Israeli authorities,” according to the Times.
But why the contradictions, the apparent Turkish turnabout
and if full rapprochement is in fact achieved, will the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) be able to sustain its still successful brand in the
Middle East that was largely achieved as a result of its pro-Palestinian
policies?
Here, we must get something straight; the strong and growing
pro-Palestinian sentiment in Turkey is not the outcome of self-serving
political agenda, neither of the AKP nor of any other. The support for
Palestinians was most apparent in the June 2011 elections, which was
convincingly won by the Erdogan party. “Turks voted on two ‘p's’ -- their
pocketbooks and Palestine,” Steven A. Cook wrote in the Atlantic on Jan 28.
“Erdogan, who plans to be Turkey's president one day and who believes that the AKP will be dominant for at least another decade, is unlikely to be receptive to a substantial improvement in Ankara's ties with Jerusalem.”
If the
centrality of Palestine is so essential to Turkish political awareness, then no
ambitious politician – for example, Erdogan, Davutoglu or President Abdullah
Gül - are likely to gamble with a major departure from their current policies.
That might be entirely true if one discounts the Syria
factor, which along with the so-called Arab Spring has complicated Turkey’s
regional standing that until two years ago was predicated on reaching out to
Iran, Syria, Libya and other Middle Eastern partners. For years prior to the
current turmoil, Turkey had cautiously yet cogently adopted a new foreign policy
that aimed at balancing out its near total reliance on NATO and the West in
general. It mended its ties with its immediate neighbors in the East, including
Iran, but polarization created by the Syria civil war has ended Turkey’s
balancing act, at least for the time being.
Turkey’s request for the deployment of Patriot missile
batteries along its border with Syria, its role in supporting the Syria
National Council and its attempt at coaxing various Kurdish groups in northern
Iraq and Syria are all proving consistent with old Turkish policies. Indeed,
Davutoglu’s zero-problems with neighbors doctrine is but a historical footnote.
The Syrian war has placed Turkey back within a Western camp,
although not with the same decisiveness of the past, when Turkey’s generals
discounted all other alliances in favor of NATO’s. This is representing an
opening for Israel, which with the support of US President Barack Obama’s new
administration is likely to translate to some measures of normalization. The
degree of that normalization will depend largely on which direction the Syrian
civil war is heading and the degree of receptiveness on Turkish streets in
seeing Israel once more paraded as Turkey’s strategic partner.
Some commentators suggest that Egypt’s own foreign policy
towards Israel – Egypt currently being the main country in the Middle East with
the ‘leverage’ of talking to both Israel and the Palestinians – is depriving
Turkey from a strong bargaining position within NATO. By having no open
contacts with Israel, some suggest Turkey is losing favor with the US and other
western partners. Interestingly, Israel’s planned apology, according to
Radikal, is supposedly timed with Obama’s visit to Israel in March.
Neither Turkey and Israel, nor the US and NATO are able to
sustain the status quo – the rift between Israel and Turkey – for much longer.
But returning to an old paradigm, where Turkey is no longer an advocate of
Palestinian rights and a champion of Arab and Muslim causes, could prove even
more costly. There can be no easy answers, especially as the region seems to be
changing partly through unpredictable dynamics.
Erdogan and his party may eventually concoct an answer. This
could include Israel and a new set of balances that would allow them access to
both East and West. But that answer would no longer be the upright,
high-minding politics Erdogan constantly advocates, but instead good old
self-serving policies and nothing else.
- Ramzy Baroud
(www.ramzybaroud.net) is an internationally-syndicated columnist and the editor
of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is: My Father was A Freedom Fighter:
Gaza's Untold Story (Pluto Press).
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