Monday, August 27, 2012

Guantánamo "Suicides" Questioned


The Guantánamo "Suicides": A Camp Delta sergeant blows the whistle

by Scott Horton - Harper's


1. “Asymmetrical Warfare”

When President Barack Obama took office last year, he promised to “restore the standards of due process and the core constitutional values that have made this country great.” Toward that end, the president issued an executive order declaring that the extra-constitutional prison camp at Guantánamo Naval Base “shall be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than one year from the date of this order.” Obama has failed to fulfill his promise. Some prisoners there are being charged with crimes, others released, but the date for closing the camp seems to recede steadily into the future. Furthermore, new evidence now emerging may entangle Obama’s young administration with crimes that occurred during the George W. Bush presidency, evidence that suggests the current administration failed to investigate seriously—and may even have continued—a cover-up of the possible homicides of three prisoners at Guantánamo in 2006.

Late on the evening of June 9 that year, three prisoners at Guantánamo died suddenly and violently. Salah Ahmed Al-Salami, from Yemen, was thirty-seven. Mani Shaman Al-Utaybi, from Saudi Arabia, was thirty. Yasser Talal Al-Zahrani, also from Saudi Arabia, was twenty-two, and had been imprisoned at Guantánamo since he was captured at the age of seventeen. None of the men had been charged with a crime, though all three had been engaged in hunger strikes to protest the conditions of their imprisonment. They were being held in a cell block, known as Alpha Block, reserved for particularly troublesome or high-value prisoners.

As news of the deaths emerged the following day, the camp quickly went into lockdown. The authorities ordered nearly all the reporters at Guantánamo to leave and those en route to turn back. The commander at Guantánamo, Rear Admiral Harry Harris, then declared the deaths “suicides.” In an unusual move, he also used the announcement to attack the dead men. “I believe this was not an act of desperation,” he said, “but an act of asymmetrical warfare waged against us.” Reporters accepted the official account, and even lawyers for the prisoners appeared to believe that they had killed themselves. Only the prisoners’ families in Saudi Arabia and Yemen rejected the notion.

Two years later, the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, which has primary investigative jurisdiction within the naval base, issued a report supporting the account originally advanced by Harris, now a vice-admiral in command of the Sixth Fleet. The Pentagon declined to make the NCIS report public, and only when pressed with Freedom of Information Act demands did it disclose parts of the report, some 1,700 pages of documents so heavily redacted as to be nearly incomprehensible. The NCIS documents were carefully cross-referenced and deciphered by students and faculty at the law school of Seton Hall University in New Jersey, and their findings, released in November 2009, made clear why the Pentagon had been unwilling to make its conclusions public. The official story of the prisoners’ deaths was full of unacknowledged contradictions, and the centerpiece of the report—a reconstruction of the events—was simply unbelievable.

According to the NCIS documents, each prisoner had fashioned a noose from torn sheets and T-shirts and tied it to the top of his cell’s eight-foot-high steel-mesh wall. Each prisoner was able somehow to bind his own hands, and, in at least one case, his own feet, then stuff more rags deep down into his own throat. We are then asked to believe that each prisoner, even as he was choking on those rags, climbed up on his washbasin, slipped his head through the noose, tightened it, and leapt from the washbasin to hang until he asphyxiated. The NCIS report also proposes that the three prisoners, who were held in non-adjoining cells, carried out each of these actions almost simultaneously.

Al-Zahrani, according to the documents, was discovered first, at 12:39 a.m., and taken by several Alpha Block guards to the camp’s detention medical clinic. No doctors could be found there, nor the phone number for one, so a clinic staffer dialed 911. During this time, other guards discovered Al-Utaybi. Still others discovered Al-Salami a few minutes later. Although rigor mortis had already set in—indicating that the men had been dead for at least two hours—the NCIS report claims that an unnamed medical officer attempted to resuscitate one of the men, and, in attempting to pry open his jaw, broke his teeth.

The fact that at least two of the prisoners also had cloth masks affixed to their faces, presumably to prevent the expulsion of the rags from their mouths, went unremarked by the NCIS, as did the fact that standard operating procedure at Camp Delta required the Navy guards on duty after midnight to “conduct a visual search” of each cell and detainee every ten minutes. The report claimed that the prisoners had hung sheets or blankets to hide their activities and shaped more sheets and pillows to look like bodies sleeping in their beds, but it did not explain where they were able to acquire so much fabric beyond their tightly controlled allotment, or why the Navy guards would allow such an obvious and immediately observable deviation from permitted behavior. Nor did the report explain how the dead men managed to hang undetected for more than two hours or why the Navy guards on duty, having for whatever reason so grievously failed in their duties, were never disciplined.

A separate report, the result of an “informal investigation” initiated by Admiral Harris, found that standard operating procedures were violated that night but concluded that disciplinary action was not warranted because of the “generally permissive environment” of the cell block and the numerous “concessions” that had been made with regard to the prisoners’ comfort, which “concessions” had resulted in a “general confusion by the guard and the JDG staff over many of the rules that applied to the guard force’s handling of the detainees.” According to Harris, even had standard operating procedures been followed, “it is possible that the detainees could have successfully committed suicide anyway.”

This is the official story, adopted by NCIS and Guantánamo command and reiterated by the Justice Department in formal pleadings, by the Defense Department in briefings and press releases, and by the State Department. Now four members of the Military Intelligence unit assigned to guard Camp Delta, including a decorated non-commissioned Army officer who was on duty as sergeant of the guard the night of June 9, have furnished an account dramatically at odds with the NCIS report—a report for which they were neither interviewed nor approached.

All four soldiers say they were ordered by their commanding officer not to speak out, and all four soldiers provide evidence that authorities initiated a cover-up within hours of the prisoners’ deaths. Army Staff Sergeant Joseph Hickman and men under his supervision have disclosed evidence in interviews with Harper’s Magazine that strongly suggests the three prisoners who died on June 9 had been transported to another location prior to their deaths. The guards’ accounts also reveal the existence of a previously unreported black site at Guantánamo where the deaths, or at least the events that led directly to the deaths, most likely occurred.

2. “Camp No”

The soldiers of the Maryland-based 629th Military Intelligence Battalion arrived at Guantánamo Naval Base in March 2006, assigned to provide security to Camp America, the sector of the base containing the five individual prison compounds that house the prisoners. Camp Delta was at the time the largest of these compounds, and within its walls were four smaller camps, numbered 1 through 4, which in turn were divided into cell blocks. Life at Camp America, as at all prisons, was and remains rigorously routinized for both prisoners and their jailers. Navy guards patrol the cell blocks and Army personnel control the exterior areas of the camp. All observed incidents must be logged. For the Army guards who man the towers and “sally ports” (access points), knowing who enters and leaves the camp, and exactly when, is the essence of their mission.

One of the new guards who arrived that March was Joe Hickman, then a sergeant. Hickman grew up in Baltimore and joined the Marines in 1983, at the age of nineteen. When I interviewed him in January at his home in Wisconsin, he told me he had been inspired to enlist by Ronald Reagan, “the greatest president we’ve ever had.” He worked in a military intelligence unit and was eventually tapped for Reagan’s Presidential Guard detail, an assignment reserved for model soldiers. When his four years were up, Hickman returned home, where he worked a series of security jobs—prison transport, executive protection, and eventually private investigations. After September 11 he decided to re-enlist, at thirty-seven, this time in the Army National Guard.

Hickman deployed to Guantánamo with his friend Specialist Tony Davila, who grew up outside Washington, D.C., and who had himself been a private investigator. When they arrived at Camp Delta, Davila told me, soldiers from the California National Guard unit they were relieving introduced him to some of the curiosities of the base. The most noteworthy of these was an unnamed and officially unacknowledged compound nestled out of sight between two plateaus about a mile north of Camp Delta, just outside Camp America’s perimeter. One day, while on patrol, Hickman and Davila came across the compound. It looked like other camps within Camp America, Davila said, only it had no guard towers and it was surrounded by concertina wire. They saw no activity, but Hickman guessed the place could house as many as eighty prisoners. One part of the compound, he said, had the same appearance as the interrogation centers at other prison camps.

The compound was not visible from the main road, and the access road was chained off. The Guardsman who told Davila about the compound had said, “This place does not exist,” and Hickman, who was frequently put in charge of security for all of Camp America, was not briefed about the site. Nevertheless, Davila said, other soldiers—many of whom were required to patrol the outside perimeter of Camp America—had seen the compound, and many speculated about its purpose. One theory was that it was being used by some of the non-uniformed government personnel who frequently showed up in the camps and were widely thought to be CIA agents.

A friend of Hickman’s had nicknamed the compound “Camp No,” the idea being that anyone who asked if it existed would be told, “No, it doesn’t.” He and Davila made a point of stopping by whenever they had the chance; once, Hickman said, he heard a “series of screams” from within the compound.

Hickman and his men also discovered that there were odd exceptions to their duties. Army guards were charged with searching and logging every vehicle that passed into and out of Camp Delta. “When John McCain came to the camp, he had to be logged in.” However, Hickman was instructed to make no record whatsoever of the movements of one vehicle in particular—a white van, dubbed the “paddy wagon,” that Navy guards used to transport heavily manacled prisoners, one at a time, into and out of Camp Delta. The van had no rear windows and contained a dog cage large enough to hold a single prisoner. Navy drivers, Hickman came to understand, would let the guards know they had a prisoner in the van by saying they were “delivering a pizza.”

The paddy wagon was used to transport prisoners to medical facilities and to meetings with their lawyers. But as Hickman monitored the paddy wagon’s movements from the guard tower at Camp Delta, he frequently saw it follow an unexpected route. When the van reached the first intersection to the east, instead of heading right—toward the other camps or toward one of the buildings where prisoners could meet with their lawyers—it made a left. In that direction, past the perimeter checkpoint known as ACP Roosevelt, there were only two destinations. One was a beach where soldiers went to swim. The other was Camp No.

# 3. “Lit up”

The night the prisoners died, Hickman was on duty as sergeant of the guard for Camp America’s exterior security force. When his twelve-hour shift began, at 6 p.m., he climbed the ladder to Tower 1, which stood twenty feet above Sally Port 1, the main entrance to Camp Delta. From there he had an excellent view of the camp, and much of the exterior perimeter as well. Later he would make his rounds.

Shortly after his shift began, Hickman noticed that someone had parked the paddy wagon near Camp 1, which houses Alpha Block. A moment later, two Navy guards emerged from Camp 1, escorting a prisoner. They put the prisoner into the back of the van and then left the camp through Sally Port 1, just below Hickman. He was under standing orders not to search the paddy wagon, so he just watched it as it headed east. He assumed the guards and their charge were bound for one of the other prison camps southeast of Camp Delta. But when the van reached the first intersection, instead of making a right, toward the other camps, it made the left, toward ACP Roosevelt and Camp No.

Twenty minutes later—about the amount of time needed for the trip to Camp No and back—the paddy wagon returned. This time Hickman paid closer attention. He couldn’t see the Navy guards’ faces, but from body size and uniform they appeared to be the same men.

The guards walked into Camp 1 and soon emerged with another prisoner. They departed Camp America, again in the direction of Camp No. Twenty minutes later, the van returned. Hickman, his curiosity piqued by the unusual flurry of activity and guessing that the guards might make another excursion, left Tower 1 and drove the three quarters of a mile to ACP Roosevelt to see exactly where the paddy wagon was headed. Shortly thereafter, the van passed through the checkpoint for the third time and then went another hundred yards, whereupon it turned toward Camp No, eliminating any question in Hickman’s mind about where it was going. All three prisoners would have reached their destination before 8 p.m.

Hickman says he saw nothing more of note until about 11:30 p.m., when he had returned to his preferred vantage at Tower 1. As he watched, the paddy wagon returned to Camp Delta. This time, however, the Navy guards did not get out of the van to enter Camp 1. Instead, they backed the vehicle up to the entrance of the medical clinic, as if to unload something.

At approximately 11:45 p.m.—nearly an hour before the NCIS claims the first body was discovered—Army Specialist Christopher Penvose, preparing for a midnight shift in Tower 1, was approached by a senior Navy NCO. Penvose told me that the NCO—who, following standard operating procedures, wore no name tag—appeared to be extremely agitated. He instructed Penvose to go immediately to the Camp Delta chow hall, identify a female senior petty officer who would be dining there, and relay to her a specific code word. Penvose did as he was instructed. The petty officer leapt up from her seat and immediately ran out of the chow hall.

Another thirty minutes passed. Then, as Hickman and Penvose both recall, Camp Delta suddenly “lit up”—stadium-style flood lights were turned on, and the camp became the scene of frenzied activity, filling with personnel in and out of uniform. Hickman headed to the clinic, which appeared to be the center of activity, to learn the reason for the commotion. He asked a distraught medical corpsman what had happened. She said three dead prisoners had been delivered to the clinic. Hickman recalled her saying that they had died because they had rags stuffed down their throats, and that one of them was severely bruised. Davila told me he spoke to Navy guards who said the men had died as the result of having rags stuffed down their throats.

Hickman was concerned that such a serious incident could have occurred in Camp 1 on his watch. He asked his tower guards what they had seen. Penvose, from his position at Tower 1, had an unobstructed view of the walkway between Camp 1 and the medical clinic—the path by which any prisoners who died at Camp 1 would be delivered to the clinic. Penvose told Hickman, and later confirmed to me, that he saw no prisoners being moved from Camp 1 to the clinic. In Tower 4 (it should be noted that Army and Navy guard-tower designations differ), another Army specialist, David Caroll, was forty-five yards from Alpha Block, the cell block within Camp 1 that had housed the three dead men. He also had an unobstructed view of the alleyway that connected the cell block itself to the clinic. He likewise reported to Hickman, and confirmed to me, that he had seen no prisoners transferred to the clinic that night, dead or alive.

4. “He Could Not Cry out”

The fate of a fourth prisoner, a forty-two-year-old Saudi Arabian named Shaker Aamer, may be related to that of the three prisoners who died on June 9. Aamer is married to a British woman and was in the process of becoming a British subject when he was captured in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, in 2001. United States authorities insist that he carried a gun and served Osama bin Laden as an interpreter. Aamer denies this. At Guantánamo, Aamer’s fluency in English soon allowed him to play an important role in camp politics. According to both Aamer’s attorney and press accounts furnished by Army Colonel Michael Bumgarner, the Camp America commander, Aamer cooperated closely with Bumgarner in efforts to bring a 2005 hunger strike to an end. He persuaded several prisoners to break their strike for a while, but the settlement collapsed and soon afterward Aamer was sent to solitary confinement. Then, on the night the prisoners from Alpha Block died, Aamer says he himself was the victim of an act of striking brutality.

He described the events in detail to his lawyer, Zachary Katznelson, who was permitted to speak to him several weeks later. Katznelson recorded every detail of Aamer’s account and filed an affidavit with the federal district court in Washington, setting it out:

On June 9th, 2006, [Aamer] was beaten for two and a half hours straight. Seven naval military police participated in his beating. Mr. Aamer stated he had refused to provide a retina scan and fingerprints. He reported to me that he was strapped to a chair, fully restrained at the head, arms and legs. The MPs inflicted so much pain, Mr. Aamer said he thought he was going to die. The MPs pressed on pressure points all over his body: his temples, just under his jawline, in the hollow beneath his ears. They choked him. They bent his nose repeatedly so hard to the side he thought it would break. They pinched his thighs and feet constantly. They gouged his eyes. They held his eyes open and shined a mag-lite in them for minutes on end, generating intense heat. They bent his fingers until he screamed. When he screamed, they cut off his airway, then put a mask on him so he could not cry out.

The treatment Aamer describes is noteworthy because it produces excruciating pain without leaving lasting marks. Still, the fact that Aamer had his airway cut off and a mask put over his face “so he could not cry out” is alarming. This is the same technique that appears to have been used on the three deceased prisoners.

The United Kingdom has pressed aggressively for the return of British subjects and persons of interest. Every individual requested by the British has been turned over, with one exception: Shaker Aamer. In denying this request, U.S. authorities have cited unelaborated “security” concerns. There is no suggestion that the Americans intend to charge him before a military commission, or in a federal criminal court, and, indeed, they have no meaningful evidence linking him to any crime. American authorities may be concerned that Aamer, if released, could provide evidence against them in criminal investigations. This evidence would include what he experienced on June 9, 2006, and during his 2002 detention in Afghanistan at Bagram Airfield, where he says he was subjected to a procedure in which his head was smashed repeatedly against a wall. This torture technique, called “walling” in CIA documents, was expressly approved at a later date by the Department of Justice.

5. “You All Know”

By dawn, the news had circulated through Camp America that three prisoners had committed suicide by swallowing rags. Colonel Bumgarner called a meeting of the guards, and at 7:00 a.m. at least fifty soldiers and sailors gathered at Camp America’s open-air theater.

Bumgarner was known as an eccentric commander. Hickman marveled, for instance, at the colonel’s insistence that his staff line up and salute him, to music selections that included Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony and the reggae hit “Bad Boys,” as he entered the command center. This morning, however, Hickman thought Bumgarner seemed unusually nervous and clipped.

According to independent interviews with soldiers who witnessed the speech, Bumgarner told his audience that “you all know” three prisoners in the Alpha Block at Camp 1 committed suicide during the night by swallowing rags, causing them to choke to death. This was a surprise to no one—even servicemen who had not worked the night before had heard about the rags. But then Bumgarner told those assembled that the media would report something different. It would report that the three prisoners had committed suicide by hanging themselves in their cells. It was important, he said, that servicemen make no comments or suggestions that in any way undermined the official report. He reminded the soldiers and sailors that their phone and email communications were being monitored. The meeting lasted no more than twenty minutes. (Bumgarner has not responded to requests for comment.)

That evening, Bumgarner’s boss, Admiral Harris, read a statement to reporters:

An alert, professional guard noticed something out of the ordinary in the cell of one of the detainees. The guard’s response was swift and professional to secure the area and check on the status of the detainee. When it was apparent that the detainee had hung himself, the guard force and medical teams reacted quickly to attempt to save the detainee’s life. The detainee was unresponsive and not breathing. [The] guard force began to check on the health and welfare of other detainees. Two detainees in their cells had also hung themselves.

When he finished praising the guards and the medics, Harris—in a notable departure from traditional military decorum—launched his attack on the men who had died on his watch. “They have no regard for human life,” Harris said, “neither ours nor their own.” A Pentagon press release issued soon after described the dead men, who had been accused of no crime, as Al Qaeda or Taliban operatives. Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey Gordon, the Pentagon’s chief press officer, went still further, telling the Guardian’s David Rose, “These guys were fanatics like the Nazis, Hitlerites, or the Ku Klux Klan, the people they tried at Nuremberg.” The Pentagon was not the only U.S. government agency to participate in the assault. Colleen Graffy, a deputy assistant secretary of state, told the BBC that “taking their own lives was not necessary, but it certainly is a good P.R. move.”

The same day the three prisoners died, Fox News commentator Bill O’Reilly completed a reporting trip to the naval base, where, according to his account on The O’Reilly Factor, the Joint Army Navy Task Force “granted the Factor near total access to the prison.” Although the Pentagon began turning away reporters after news of the deaths had emerged, two reporters from the Charlotte Observer, Michael Gordon and photographer Todd Sumlin, had arrived that morning to work on a profile of Bumgarner, and the colonel invited them to shadow him as he dealt with the crisis. A Pentagon spokesman later told the Observer it had been expecting a “puff piece,” which is why, according to the Observer, “Bumgarner and his superiors on the base” had given them permission to remain.

Bumgarner quickly returned to his theatrical ways. As Gordon reported in the June 13, 2006, issue of the Observer, the colonel seemed to enjoy putting on a show. “Right now, we are at ground zero,” Bumgarner told his officer staff during a June 12 meeting. Referring to the naval base’s prisoners, he said, “There is not a trustworthy son of a bitch in the entire bunch.” In the same article, Gordon also noted what he had learned about the deaths. The suicides had occurred “in three cells on the same block,” he reported. The prisoners had “hanged themselves with strips of knotted cloth taken from clothing and sheets,” after shaping their pillows and blankets to look like sleeping bodies. “And Bumgarner said,” Gordon reported, “each had a ball of cloth in their mouth either for choking or muffling their voices.”

Something about Bumgarner’s Observer interview seemed to have set off an alarm far up the chain of command. No sooner was Gordon’s story in print than Bumgarner was called to Admiral Harris’s office. As Bumgarner would tell Gordon in a follow-up profile three months later, Harris was holding up a copy of the Observer: “This,” said the admiral to Bumgarner, “could get me relieved.” (Harris did not respond to requests for comment.) That same day, an investigation was launched to determine whether classified information had been leaked from Guantánamo. Bumgarner was suspended.

Less than a week after the appearance of the Observer stories, Davila and Hickman each heard separately from friends in the Navy and in the military police that FBI agents had raided the colonel’s quarters. The MPs understood from their FBI contacts that there was concern over the possibility that Bumgarner had taken home some classified materials and was planning to share them with the media or to use them in writing a book.

On June 27, two weeks later, Gordon’s Observer colleague Scott Dodd reported: “A brigadier general determined that ‘unclassified sensitive information’ was revealed to the public in the days after the June 10 suicides.” Harris, according to the article, had already ordered “appropriate administrative action.” Bumgarner soon left Guantánamo for a new post in Missouri. He now serves as an ROTC instructor at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg.

Bumgarner’s comments appear to be at odds with the official Pentagon narrative on only one point: that the deaths had involved cloth being stuffed into the prisoners’ mouths. The involvement of the FBI suggested that more was at issue.

6. “An Unmistakable Message”

On June 10, NCIS investigators began interviewing the Navy guards in charge of Alpha Block, but after the Pentagon committed itself to the suicide narrative, they appear to have stopped. On June 14, the interviews resumed, and the NCIS informed at least six Navy guards that they were suspected of making false statements or failing to obey direct orders. No disciplinary action ever followed.

The investigators conducted interviews with guards, medics, prisoners, and officers. As the Seton Hall researchers note, however, nothing in the NCIS report suggests that the investigators secured or reviewed the duty roster, the prisoner-transfer book, the pass-on book, the records of phone and radio communications, or footage from the camera that continuously monitored activity in the hallways, all of which could have helped them authoritatively reconstruct the events of that evening.

The NCIS did, however, move swiftly to seize every piece of paper possessed by every single prisoner in Camp America, some 1,065 pounds of material, much of it privileged attorney-client correspondence. Several weeks later, authorities sought an after-the-fact justification. The Justice Department—bolstered by sworn statements from Admiral Harris and from Carol Kisthardt, the special agent in charge of the NCIS investigation—claimed in a U.S. district court that the seizure was appropriate because there had been a conspiracy among the prisoners to commit suicide. Justice further claimed that investigators had found suicide notes and argued that the attorney-client materials were being used to pass communications among the prisoners.

David Remes, a lawyer who opposed the Justice Department’s efforts, explained the practical effect of the government’s maneuvers. The seizure, he said, “sent an unmistakable message to the prisoners that they could not expect their communications with their lawyers to remain confidential. The Justice Department defended the massive breach of the attorney-client privilege on the account of the deaths on June 9 and the asserted need to investigate them.”

If the “suicides” were a form of warfare between the prisoners and the Bush Administration, as Admiral Harris charged, it was the latter that quickly turned the war to its advantage.

7. “Yasser Couldn’t Even Make a Sandwich!”

When I asked Talal Al-Zahrani what he thought had happened to his son, he was direct. “They snatched my seventeen-year-old son for a bounty payment,” he said. “They took him to Guantánamo and held him prisoner for five years. They tortured him. Then they killed him and returned him to me in a box, cut up.”

Al-Zahrani was a brigadier general in the Saudi police. He dismissed the Pentagon’s claims, as well as the investigation that supported them. Yasser, he said, was a young man who loved to play soccer and didn’t care for politics. The Pentagon claimed that Yasser’s frontline battle experience came from his having been a cook in a Taliban camp. Al-Zahrani said that this was preposterous: “A cook? Yasser couldn’t even make a sandwich!”

“Yasser wasn’t guilty of anything,” Al-Zahrani said. “He knew that. He firmly believed he would be heading home soon. Why would he commit suicide?” The evidence supports this argument. Hyperbolic U.S. government statements at the time of Yasser Al-Zahrani’s death masked the fact that his case had been reviewed and that he was, in fact, on a list of prisoners to be sent home. I had shown Al-Zahrani the letter that the government says was Yasser’s suicide note and asked him whether he recognized his son’s handwriting. He had never seen the note before, he answered, and no U.S. official had ever asked him about it. After studying the note carefully, he said, “This is a forgery.”

Also returned to Saudi Arabia was the body of Mani Al-Utaybi. Orphaned in his youth, Mani grew up in his uncle’s home in the small town of Dawadmi. I spoke to one of the many cousins who shared that home, Faris Al-Utaybi. Mani, said Faris, had gone to Baluchistan—a rural, tribal area that straddles Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan—to do humanitarian work, and someone there had sold him to the Americans for $5,000. He said that Mani was a peaceful man who would harm no one. Indeed, U.S. authorities had decided to release Al-Utaybi and return him to Saudi Arabia. When he died, he was just a few weeks shy of his transfer.

Salah Al-Salami was seized in March 2002, when Pakistani authorities raided a residence in Karachi believed to have been used as a safe house by Abu Zubaydah and took into custody all who were living there at the time. A Yemeni, Al-Salami had quit his job and moved to Pakistan with only $400 in his pocket. The U.S. suspicions against him rested almost entirely on the fact that he had taken lodgings, with other students, in a boarding house that terrorists might at one point have used. There was no direct evidence linking him either to Al Qaeda or to the Taliban. On August 22, 2008, the Washington Post quoted from a previously secret review of his case: “There is no credible information to suggest [Al-Salami] received terrorist related training or is a member of the Al Qaeda network.” All that stood in the way of Al-Salami’s release from Guantánamo were difficult diplomatic relations between the United States and Yemen.

8. “The Removal of the Neck Organs”

Military pathologists connected with the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology arranged immediate autopsies of the three dead prisoners, without securing the permission of the men’s families. The identities and findings of the pathologists remain shrouded in extraordinary secrecy, but the timing of the autopsies suggests that medical personnel stationed at Guantánamo may have undertaken the procedure without waiting for the arrival of an experienced medical examiner from the United States. Each of the heavily redacted autopsy reports states unequivocally that “the manner of death is suicide” and, more specifically, that the prisoner died of “hanging.” Each of the reports describes ligatures that were found wrapped around the prisoner’s neck, as well as circumferential dried abrasion furrows imprinted with the very fine weave pattern of the ligature fabric and forming an inverted “V” on the back of the head. This condition, the anonymous pathologists state, is consistent with that of a hanging victim.

The pathologists place the time of death “at least a couple of hours” before the bodies were discovered, which would be sometime before 10:30 p.m. on June 9. Additionally, the autopsy of Al-Salami states that his hyoid bone was broken, a phenomenon usually associated with manual strangulation, not hanging.

The report asserts that the hyoid was broken “during the removal of the neck organs.” An odd admission, given that these are the very body parts—the larynx, the hyoid bone, and the thyroid cartilage—that would have been essential to determining whether death occurred from hanging, from strangulation, or from choking. These parts remained missing when the men’s families finally received their bodies.

All the families requested independent autopsies. The Saudi prisoners were examined by Saeed Al-Ghamdy, a pathologist based in Saudi Arabia. Al-Salami, from Yemen, was inspected by Patrice Mangin, a pathologist based in Switzerland. Both pathologists noted the removal of the structure that would have been the natural focus of the autopsy: the throat. Both pathologists contacted the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, requesting the missing body parts and more information about the previous autopsies. The institute did not respond to their requests or queries. (It also did not respond to a series of calls I placed requesting information and comment.)

When Al-Zahrani viewed his son’s corpse, he saw evidence of a homicide. “There was a major blow to the head on the right side,” he said. “There was evidence of torture on the upper torso, and on the palms of his hand. There were needle marks on his right arm and on his left arm.” None of these details are noted in the U.S. autopsy report. “I am a law enforcement professional,” Al-Zahrani said. “I know what to look for when examining a body.”

Mangin, for his part, expressed particular concern about Al-Salami’s mouth and throat, where he saw “a blunt trauma carried out against the oral region.” The U.S. autopsy report mentions an effort at resuscitation, but this, in Mangin’s view, did not explain the severity of the injuries. He also noted that some of the marks on the neck were not those he would normally associate with hanging.

9. “I Know Some Things You Don’t”

Sergeant Joe Hickman’s tour of duty, which ended in March 2007, was distinguished: he was selected as Guantánamo’s “NCO of the Quarter” and was given a commendation medal. When he returned to the United States, he was promoted to staff sergeant and worked in Maryland as an Army recruiter before eventually settling in Wisconsin. But he could not forget what he had seen at Guantánamo. When Barack Obama became president, Hickman decided to act. “I thought that with a new administration and new ideas I could actually come forward, ” he said. “It was haunting me.”

Hickman had seen a 2006 report from Seton Hall University Law School dealing with the deaths of the three prisoners, and he followed their subsequent work. After Obama was inaugurated in January 2009, he called Mark Denbeaux, the professor who had led the Seton Hall team. “I learned something from your report,” he said, “but I know some things you don’t.”

Within two days, Hickman was in Newark, meeting with Denbeaux. Also at the meeting was Denbeaux’s son and sometime co-editor, Josh, a private attorney. Josh Denbeaux agreed to represent Hickman, who was concerned that he could go to prison if he disobeyed Colonel Bumgarner’s order not to speak out, even if that order was itself illegal. Hickman did not want to speak to the press. On the other hand, he felt that “silence was just wrong.”

The two lawyers quickly made arrangements for Hickman to speak instead with authorities in Washington, D.C. On February 2, they had meetings on Capitol Hill and with the Department of Justice. The meeting with Justice was an odd one. The father-and-son legal team were met by Rita Glavin, the acting head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division; John Morton, who was soon to become an assistant secretary at the Department of Homeland Security; and Steven Fagell, counselor to the head of the Criminal Division. Fagell had been, along with the new attorney general, Eric Holder, a partner at the elite Washington law firm of Covington & Burling, and was widely viewed as “Holder’s eyes” in the Criminal Division.

For more than an hour, the two lawyers described what Hickman had seen: the existence of Camp No, the transportation of the three prisoners, the van’s arrival at the medical clinic, the lack of evidence that any bodies had ever been removed from Alpha Block, and so on. The officials listened intently and asked many questions. The Denbeauxes said they could provide a list of witnesses who would corroborate every aspect of their account. At the end of the meeting, Mark Denbeaux recalled, the officials specifically thanked the lawyers for not speaking to reporters first and for “doing it the right way.”

Two days later, another Justice Department official, Teresa McHenry, head of the Criminal Division’s Domestic Security Section, called Mark Denbeaux and said that she was heading up an investigation and wanted to meet directly with his client. She went to New Jersey to do so. Hickman then reviewed the basic facts and furnished McHenry with the promised list of corroborating witnesses and details on how they could be contacted.

The Denbeauxes did not hear from anyone at the Justice Department for at least two months. Then, in April, an FBI agent called to say she did not have the list of contacts. She asked if this document could be provided again. It was. Shortly thereafter, Fagell [see update] and two FBI agents interviewed Davila, who had left the Army, in Columbia, South Carolina. Fagell asked Davila if he was prepared to travel to Guantánamo to identify the locations of various sites. He said he was. “It seemed like they were interested,” Davila told me. “Then I never heard from them again.”

Several more months passed, and Hickman and his lawyers became increasingly concerned that nothing was going to happen. On October 27, 2009, they resumed dealings with Congress that they had initiated on February 2 and then broken off at the Justice Department’s request; they were also in contact with ABC News. Two days later, Teresa McHenry called Mark Denbeaux and asked whether he had gone to Congress and ABC News about the matter. “I said that I had,” Denbeaux told me. He asked her, “Was there anything wrong with that?” McHenry then suggested that the investigation was finished. Denbeaux reminded her that she had yet to interview some of the corroborating witnesses. “There are a few small things to do,” Denbeaux says McHenry answered. “Then it will be finished.”

Specialist Christopher Penvose told me that on October 30, the day following the conversation between Mark Denbeaux and Teresa McHenry, McHenry an official [see update] showed up at Penvose’s home in south Baltimore with some FBI agents. She had a “few questions,” she told him. Investigators working with her soon contacted two other witnesses.

On November 2, 2009, McHenry called Mark Denbeaux to tell him that the Justice Department’s investigation was being closed. “It was a strange conversation,” Denbeaux recalled. McHenry explained that “the gist of Sergeant Hickman’s information could not be confirmed.” But when Denbeaux asked what that “gist” actually was, McHenry declined to say. She just reiterated that Hickman’s conclusions “appeared” to be unsupported. Denbeaux asked what conclusions exactly were unsupported. McHenry refused to say.

10. “They Accomplished Nothing”

One of the most intriguing aspects of this case concerns the use of Camp No. Under George W. Bush, the CIA created an archipelago of secret detention centers that spanned the globe, and authorities at these sites deployed an array of Justice Department–sanctioned torture techniques—including waterboarding, which often entails inserting cloth into the subject’s mouth—on prisoners they deemed to be involved in terrorism. The presence of a black site at Guantánamo has long been a subject of speculation among lawyers and human-rights activists, and the experience of Sergeant Hickman and other Guantánamo guards compels us to ask whether the three prisoners who died on June 9 were being interrogated by the CIA, and whether their deaths resulted from the grueling techniques the Justice Department had approved for the agency’s use—or from other tortures lacking that sanction.

Complicating these questions is the fact that Camp No might have been controlled by another authority, the Joint Special Operations Command, which Bush’s defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, had hoped to transform into a Pentagon version of the CIA. Under Rumsfeld’s direction, JSOC began to take on many tasks traditionally handled by the CIA, including the housing and interrogation of prisoners at black sites around the world. The Pentagon recently acknowledged the existence of one such JSOC black site, located at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, and other suspected sites, such as Camp Nama in Baghdad, have been carefully documented by human-rights researchers.

In a Senate Armed Services Committee report on torture released last year, the sections about Guantánamo were significantly redacted. The position and circumstances of these deletions point to a significant JSOC interrogation program at the base. (It should be noted that Obama’s order last year to close other secret detention camps was narrowly worded to apply only to the CIA.)

Regardless of whether Camp No belonged to the CIA or JSOC, the Justice Department has plenty of its own secrets to protect. The department would seem to have been involved in the cover-up from the first days, when FBI agents stormed Colonel Bumgarner’s quarters. This was unusual for two reasons. When Pentagon officials engage in a leak investigation, they generally use military investigators. They rarely turn to the FBI, because they cannot control the actions of a civilian agency. Moreover, when the FBI does open an investigation, it nearly always does so with great discretion. The Bumgarner investigation was widely telegraphed, though, and seemed intended to send a message to the military personnel at Camp Delta: Talk about what happened at your own risk. All of which suggests it was not the Pentagon so much as the White House that hoped to suppress the truth.

In the weeks following the 2006 deaths, the Justice Department decided to use the suicide narrative as leverage against the Guantánamo prisoners and their troublesome lawyers, who were pressing the government to justify its long-term imprisonment of their clients. After the NCIS seized thousands of pages of privileged communications, the Justice Department went to court to defend the action. It argued that such steps were warranted by the extraordinary facts surrounding the June 9 “suicides.” U.S. District Court Judge James Robertson gave the Justice Department a sympathetic hearing, and he ruled in its favor, but he also noted a curious aspect of the government’s presentation: its “citations supporting the fact of the suicides” were all drawn from media accounts. Why had the Justice Department lawyers who argued the case gone to such lengths to avoid making any statement under oath about the suicides? Did they do so in order to deceive the court? If so, they could face disciplinary proceedings or disbarment.

The Justice Department also faces questions about its larger role in creating the circumstances that led to the use of so-called enhanced interrogation and restraint techniques at Guantánamo and elsewhere. In 2006, the use of a gagging restraint had already been connected to the death on January 9, 2004, of an Iraqi prisoner, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Jameel, in the custody of the Army Special Forces. And the bodies of the three men who died at Guantánamo showed signs of torture, including hemorrhages, needle marks, and significant bruising. The removal of their throats made it difficult to determine whether they were already dead when their bodies were suspended by a noose. The Justice Department itself had been deeply involved in the process of approving and setting the conditions for the use of torture techniques, issuing a long series of memoranda that CIA agents and others could use to defend themselves against any subsequent criminal prosecution.

Teresa McHenry, the investigator charged with accounting for the deaths of the three men at Guantánamo, has firsthand knowledge of the Justice Department’s role in auditing such techniques, having served at the Justice Department under Bush and having participated in the preparation of at least one of those memos. As a former war-crimes prosecutor, McHenry knows full well that government officials who attempt to cover up crimes perpetrated against prisoners in wartime face prosecution under the doctrine of command responsibility. (McHenry declined to clarify the role she played in drafting the memos.)

As retired Rear Admiral John Hutson, the former judge advocate general of the Navy, told me, “Filing false reports and making false statements is bad enough, but if a homicide occurs and officials up the chain of command attempt to cover it up, they face serious criminal liability. They may even be viewed as accessories after the fact in the original crime.” With command authority comes command responsibility, he said. “If the heart of the military is obeying orders down the chain of command, then its soul is accountability up the chain. You can’t demand the former without the latter.”

The Justice Department thus faced a dilemma; it could do the politically convenient thing, which was to find no justification for a thorough investigation, leave the NCIS conclusions in place, and hope that the public and the news media would obey the Obama Administration’s dictum to “look forward, not backward”; or it could pursue a course of action that would implicate the Bush Justice Department in a cover-up of possible homicides.

Nearly 200 men remain imprisoned at Guantánamo. In June 2009, six months after Barack Obama took office, one of them, a thirty-one-year-old Yemeni named Muhammed Abdallah Salih, was found dead in his cell. The exact circumstances of his death, like those of the deaths of the three men from Alpha Block, remain uncertain. Those charged with accounting for what happened—the prison command, the civilian and military investigative agencies, the Justice Department, and ultimately the attorney general himself—all face a choice between the rule of law and the expedience of political silence. Thus far, their choice has been unanimous.

Not everyone who is involved in this matter views it from a political perspective, of course. General Al-Zahrani grieves for his son, but at the end of a lengthy interview he paused and his thoughts turned elsewhere. “The truth is what matters,” he said. “They practiced every form of torture on my son and on many others as well. What was the result? What facts did they find? They found nothing. They learned nothing. They accomplished nothing.”


More by this author...



Whither Lebanon's Palestinians?

Hope and Despair for Lebanon’s Palestinians

by  Franklin Lamb - Beirut

Remarkably, this Ramadan holiday season in Lebanon designees from both the Shia Higher Islamic Shiites Council and the Sunni Dar el Fatwa, figuratively speaking, pointed their binoculars deep into the eastern sky and in almost unheard of unison, proclaimed that Eid al Fitr this year was to be August 19th. It was a good omen for many in Lebanon that Shia and Sunni religious leaders agreed of this important event given the internal and external forces at work to further divide the two main denominations of Islam as well as all of Lebanon by sect, confession, geography, region, tribe, clan and neighborhood.

It was also good news for Palestinians living in places like Finland which these days have approximately 20 hours per day of sunlight and many devout Muslims have very long fasts. Mercifully, a majority of Muslims far up North tend to adopt the mere sixteen hours of daylight for seyam (fasting) using Mecca hours for dawn to dusk days without, food, water, sex, or smoking as well as avoiding bad thoughts or acts of incivility as they test and renew their devotion to Islam while engaging in introspective struggle self-criticism.

During the three day Al Fitr holiday, much of Muslim Lebanon becomes less active and many businesses close including Lebanon’s largest wholesale fruit and vegetable market which borders Shatila Palestinian refugee camp. Just before closing time on Eid eve, this observer entered the vast produce market now run mainly by Shia who buy agriculture products from Bekaa Valley and southern farmers (minus one of Lebanon’s oldest and most important crops, Hashish or “ Lebanese Red Bud” as it’s known in Amsterdam smoke cafes and elsewhere).

With little refrigeration, many of the wholesalers next to Shatila dumped, in time for Iftar and Eid feasts, large quantities of really fine produce at a designated corner of the ten acre market. They have been doing this for more than three years ever since the Palestine Civil Rights Campaign was lucky enough to convince the owners to dump their leftovers or soon to spoil fruit and vegetables in the southeast corner bordering Shatila camp. As a result of this charitable cross-denomination act, rather than disposing of the extra produce in dumpsters, Palestinian refugee families are given the much appreciated chance to collect free produce for their families.

Every day, men women and children from Shatila camp, as well as poor Lebanese and Syrian workers can be seen climbing over and thru hewn holes in the cinderblock wall bordering Shatila and gathering really excellent produce. This basic humanitarian gesture is an example of how the Shia can, and do, reach out to the largely Sunni Palestinian community. Cross-confessional gestures such as this are among the reasons Palestinians in Lebanon support Hezbollah and the growing regional and international Resistance it leads.

Eid al Fita also coincides this year with International Quds Day which was introduced from Iran in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini and which is commemorated on the last Friday of Ramadan,expressing solidarity with the Palestinian people and opposing Zionism and Israel’s control of Jerusalem.

In Lebanon’s refugee camps this Eid Al Fitr holiday season there is intense heat, little electricity or drinking water, and a paucity of fresh air or breeze available to the jammed populations. Ein el Helwe, the largest of Lebanon’s 12 camps which according to the most recent UNWRA statistics houses 47,500 refugees but in reality now is home to more than 100,000. They like their fellow countrymen temporarily in Lebanon, have few reasons to celebrate. The competition for breathing space has increased as the camps populations have swelled even more with refugees fleeing the violence in Syria.

This year there are fewer sweets for the children, less food, not many gifts or new clothes and few flowers to place on the graves of deceased love ones, a gesture by custom made during traditional Eid Al Fitr cemetery visits. In the tightly packed Palestinian cemeteries, of which they are only four in Lebanon, sometimes as many as five layers of bodies are buried on top of one another due to lack of space.

There is another anniversary that coincides in Lebanon this year with Eid al Fitr and with International Al Quds day but it’s no occasion for joy among the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

It is the second anniversary of the August 17, 2010 amendment to article 59 of the Lebanese Labor Law which constituted a betrayal of Palestinian refugees by Lebanese politicians. Before the vote, across the political spectrum were heard promises to enact legislation granting the elementary civil rights to work and to own a home in Lebanon. This country is the only one on earth that denies Palestinian refugees the basic right to work or even to own a home.

The legislation passed was simply a cruel hoax and has not facilitated one Palestinian refugee obtaining a job over the past 24 months. The amendment, while waiving work permit fees which were never a serious problem in obtaining a work permit, left in place numerous restrictions and catch-22 Kafqesque barriers that previously blocked Palestinians from being able to work. Parliament also left in place the racist 2001 law which outlawed any Palestinian from owning a home.

Ministers of Labor over the past two years have willfully failed to implement the new law, such as it is, by refusing the simple act of signing implementation papers. Less than two months ago a Palestinian delegation was promised yet again that a majority party in Parliament would see to it that the Minister of Labor did his job as mandated by the Lebanese constitution. Once more nothing was done. On this second anniversary of the fake “Palestinian work permit legislation” most Lebanese politicians who made so many promises to this observer and others over the past four years to comply with international and Lebanese law and grant basic civil rights to Palestinians in Lebanon remain asleep on this issue.

Nevertheless, the hope of Palestinian refugees to achieve the basic civil right to work and to own a home is not extinguished in the camps this holiday season by the impotence of Lebanon’s big talk but do nothing Parliament. One reason for hope comes from the voices of people like Miss Hiba Hajj, a Palestinian princess living in Ein el Helwe camp. This observer visited with her recently after sneaking into Ein el Helwe camp thru that smelly claustrophobic 30 inch, heavily trafficked sewer conduit at the eastern edge of the camp. The US Embassy here made crawling through the sewer line sort of obligatory for Americans wanting to visit Ein el Helwe camp ever since it directed the Lebanese Armed Force (LAF) not to grant Americans permission to enter the camp out of presumed, but misplaced, concern for their wellbeing. It was Hiba (“gift from God” in Arabic), then a youngster of 14 years, who proclaimed three years ago when she volunteered to help achieve the right to work and home ownership for “my people” as she referred to them, stated to this observer and friends: “Failure is not an option for the Palestine Civil Rights Campaign, our only choice is success.” And so it remains.

While the most elementary civil rights still have not been granted, Hiba continues to inspire us all with her rapid, charismatic and at times mesmerizing speech outlining what needs to be done and how to do it to achieve dignity for her fellow refugees. This blooming seventeen year old Jean d’Arc, has zero problem smacking around, verbally at least, some of the toughest looking unkempt wannebe salafists and jahadists from the eight Islamist groups who periodically show up in Ein el Helwe. Hiba explains that she definitely wants the help of Usbat al-Ansar, who earlier this month helped resolve the traffic blocking sit-in by the controversial preacher, Sheikh Ahmad Assir in nearby Saida, but she demurs from the fictitious Jund al-Sham, or gangs who claim a spot under the imaginary loose cloak of al-Qaeda.

“I want you to do something worthwhile with your lives so we can get back to Palestine without more delay! Do you want to spend your lives in Lebanon? It’s not and will never be our country!” she scolds them as she asks for help to organize a major intifada here in Lebanon to prevent another anniversary from passing without Palestinian refugees attaining the civil rights to work and to own a home.

Hiba is encouraged this holiday season despite the failures of Lebanon’s political parties, international activists, the international community “so very concerned with humanitarian values!” as she lectures her mates, and most especially the failure to date of groups here in Lebanon including the Palestine Civil Rights Campaign to achieve our goals.

This remarkable youngster idealistically reminds her coterie of likeminded teens of last week’s words of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General who she and her friends admire, trust, and believe.

During his International Al-Quds Day speech, Hassan Nasrallah stated that Imam Khomeini`s declaration of Al-Quds Day falls within the context of a long continuum of religious and political commitment to “the sacred cause of Palestine” and that Al-Quds Day should not be simply a seasonal occasion to support the Palestinian people.

Hezbollah’s Secretary-General added,

“Unfortunately, today the suffering of the Palestinian people (Hiba thinks he also means within Lebanon’s camps) has become secondary and just ordinary news items in the Arab and Islamic world, even in the entire world which claims to be civilized, the news has become second row even late news. Today, the nation can do much for Palestine and its people. At the very least, the rulers can themselves stop blockading the Palestinians before asking them to assist in lifting the siege off the Palestinians. A Part of the blockade suffered by the Palestinian people is practiced by some Arab regimes. This embargo must be lifted and support must be submitted”.

Hiba and her friends interpreted these words to mean Hezbollah will use its power in Parliament and finally grant them the right to work in Lebanon thus delivering to them a less bleak future. Palestinians in Lebanon, and their international supporters, are acutely aware that Hezbollah still holds majority power in Parliament and will do so at least until next year’s Parliamentary elections if they are even held which to this observer appears doubtful.

Hiba particularly liked Hezbollah’s Secretary-General’s words which she quoted: “We must help the Palestinians towards this cause to uphold the right of return and to refuse any resettlement as well as to reject assimilation in any country as is happening through their forced migration to countries in Latin America, Europe, Australia and others.”

Members of Parliament who support this country granting the right to work and to own a home to Palestinians insist that if the political decision is made by the Parliamentary majority led by Hezbollah, the necessary legislation, still in the legislative hopper from two years ago, can be enacted in an afternoon.

Hiba and Hezbollah’s other supporters who share Sayed Hassan Nasrallah’s oft expressed views demanding basic human rights for Palestinians in Lebanon believe that the Resistance block will, on this 30th anniversary of the massacre at Sabra-Shatila, finally act on what the late Imam Khomeini declared was a central “moral, religious, and political” obligation of all people of good will.



Franklin Lamb is doing research in Lebanon and is reachable c/o fplamb@gmail.com.



Imperial Proxy Wars: The Syria Front

What is Happening in Syria is an Imperialist Proxy War

by Finian Cunningham

The UN-Arab League’s new peace envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, says he is not confident about the prospect of restoring peace in Syria. After giving his first major public comment on the conflict, it is not surprising to hear the veteran Algerian diplomat voicing his lack of confidence.

This is because he is either completely misinformed on the violence in Syria; or, more likely, because Brahimi is deliberately misinforming the rest of the world about the problem at hand.

It should be a matter of deep misgiving that, only days after the former Algerian foreign minister took up the post, his first port of call was to have a private meeting with French President Francois Hollande in the Elysee Palace, Paris. The former colonial power is hardly a neutral party to the raging conflict in Syria. France, and the other Western powers, are up to their neck in the bloodshed that is spilling across the Levant.

For months now, it has been reported that France, along with that other colonial has-been Britain, dispatched Special Forces to operate covertly in Syria, helping the insurgency wage a campaign of sabotage to bring down the government of President Bashar al-Assad. Only last weekend, the French government made its policy towards Syria abundantly clear when Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, visiting refugee camps in Turkey, announced that the Syrian authorities should be “smashed”.

Fabius even went as far as calling for Assad’s personal liquidation by adding that “he should not be allowed on this earth”. Let’s just dwell on that for a minute. The French government is in effect calling for the overthrow of a sovereign government and the assassination of a head of state. Such language is the policy of a lawless rogue power that has abdicated any pretence of abiding by the charter of the UN.

How can Brahimi expect to be taken seriously as an honest broker when he openly defers to a criminal party in the conflict – a party that is acting wholly illegally in its interference in the affairs of a sovereign state?

Brahimi, who previously served as the UN representative to Iraq and Afghanistan, is replacing Kofi Annan as the so-called United Nations-Arab League “point man” in Syria. Annan quit the task earlier this month after his six-point peace plan initiated in April was systematically scuppered by Western, Arab and Turk-backed foreign militants trying to overthrow Assad over the past 17 months.

At the time of his resignation, Annan told the Financial Times on 2 August that his proposed ceasefire was doomed because “sustained international support did not follow… The ceasefire quickly unraveled.” This startling admission – albeit couched in typically vague diplomatic language – should have made front-page news. What Annan was saying then was that the international backers of the Syrian insurgents – that is the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, Israel and the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies – did not support the initiative. In plain language, these powers killed the UN-brokered ceasefire. That Annan did not explicitly lay the blame is to his discredit.

This crucial factor reveals the real nature of the conflict in Syria. It is not, as the Western governments and their media have been asserting, a popular uprising from within the country that has led to a battle between state forces and rebels. This scenario suggests that Syria is wracked in a civil war between national factions. But this assessment of the situation is a travesty of the truth. It so happens that Syrian government’s claims are closer to the truth. That is, that the country is being assailed and destabilized by a foreign-backed insurgency.

Russia and China are in agreement with the official position in Damascus, and that is why these powers have rejected Western attempts through the UN Security Council to oust the Assad government. Both Moscow and Beijing correctly view the Western agenda towards Syria as a politically driven plan for regime change. The Western narrative of painting the Assad government as “a brutal oppressor” plays to a moral pseudo-concern for the protection of human rights and thereby gives the Western powers cover for illegal intervention – in the same way that they did in Libya last year, using a fake “responsibility to protect” pretext to unleash a seven-month bombing campaign to overthrow the government in Tripoli that led to the murder of the country’s leader Muammar Gaddafi.

Since the covert intervention by Western powers in Syria, along with their regional allies, has greatly escalated the violence in that country in recent months, the above narrative of “brutal oppressor” is no longer plausible. That is why Western governments and media are now talking in terms of “civil war” and portraying the conflict as one between a reprehensible regime and freedom-loving rebels.

But the Western narrative of “civil war” in Syria is also beneath contempt. Just in the past week, it has been revealed that British and German military intelligence are acting as the eyes and ears of the armed militia in Syria, directing them to sharpen assaults against the Syrian state forces in the commercial capital of Aleppo.

Most of these armed groups have infiltrated Syria from foreign countries such as Libya, Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen and even as far away as Pakistan and Chechnya. It is now widely reported that these mercenaries are affiliated to al-Qaeda and other extremist Salafist groups that have a long history of collaboration with the US, Britain and Saudi Arabia going back to the guerrilla war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

This global proxy mercenary army – that was previously the West’s supposed enemy in the “war on terror” – is now doing the bidding in Syria of the US, Britain, France, Germany, as well as Turkey, Israel and the Persian Gulf monarchies. This US-led axis wants to overthrow the Syrian government, which it views as being resistant to Western hegemonic objectives in the Middle East. These objectives include thwarting the pro-democracy movement of the Arab Spring and undermining Syria’s ally, Hezbollah, in Lebanon, with a view to shoring up the unsustainable pro-Western Zionist regime. The Western objectives also include undercutting and eventually overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thereby circumscribing the influence of Russia and China in the vital energy-rich Middle East and Central Asian regions.

What is happening in Syria is an imperialist proxy war. The people of that country are being subjected to an all-out campaign of terrorism and sabotage to bring down the West’s perceived enemy in Damascus, to replace it with a regime that is pliable to Western geopolitical objectives.

Reliable sources in Syria report that there is negligible popular support for the Western-backed mercenaries running amok in that country. Indeed, the general populace seems to be living under a foreign-backed reign of terror, with no-warning car bombs in the capital, Damascus, and the second, northern city of Aleppo, and whole villages being massacred by Salafist gangs trying to fuel a sectarian bloodbath. Families tell of being turned out of their homes under pain of death, to make way for sniper posts and bomb factories, their loved ones being kidnapped and held to ransom.

The heinous game plan is to turn a once pluralist society of Shia, Sunni, Christian, Druze, Jew and non-believer into a charnel house of sectarian bloodletting in much the same way as Libya and other countries that have succumbed to Western “protection”.

Given the appalling reality of violence in Syria, and in particular the criminal Western involvement in fomenting, fuelling and directing foreign-backed subversion, it is surely a sickening farce to portray the situation as a “civil war”.

Yet this is what the new UN envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, is seeking to do. After his private audience with Francois Hollande at weekend, Brahimi lamented the violence in Syria thus:

“A civil war, it is the cruelest kind of conflict, when a neighbour kills his neighbour and sometimes his brother, it is the worst of conflicts. There are a lot of people who say that we must avoid civil war in Syria. Me, I believe that we are already there for some time now. What’s necessary is to stop the civil war and that is not going to be easy.”

Brahimi is distorting the reality of Western mass murder and subversion in Syria. He is serving to lend contemptible cover to those external forces that are tearing Syria apart by giving the mayhem a veneer of “civil war”. In that way, he is following in the disgraceful footsteps of Kofi Annan and is proving to be less a point man for the UN and more a point man for the US.



Finian Cunningham, is a columnist at Press TV and a Featured Writer on Dandelion Salad. He can be reached at cunninghamfinian@gmail.com.

see also:
PressTV – Iran NAM summit sends message of peace by Finian Cunningham
see
Don DeBar: Western powers antithetical to peace in Syria + Sharmine Narwani: U.S. falls into trap of extremists + Phyllis Bennis: Intervention into Syria already underway
Israel may launch a pre-emptive military attack on Syria + The battle of Damascus has begun by Thierry Meyssan
Goal is Regime Change – The Pretext of WMD in Syria by Finian Cunningham
on Dandelion Salad
Videos on Syria: http://lockerz.com/c/5967048?ref=19638403

Affirming a Peaceful Judaism

Judith Butler responds to attack: ‘I affirm a Judaism that is not associated with state violence’

by Dr. Judith Butler - Mondoweiss

Yesterday the Jerusalem Post published an attack on the awarding of a major international prize to Judith Butler, the philosopher and Berkeley professor of comparative literature, because Butler favors boycotting Israel. Butler wrote this response and, unhopeful that the Post would publish it, sent it to us. --Editors.


The Jerusalem Post recently published an article reporting that some organizations are opposed to my receiving the Adorno Prize, an award given every three years to someone who works in the tradition of critical theory broadly construed. The accusations against me are that I support Hamas and Hezbollah (which is not true) that I support BDS (partially true), and that I am anti-Semitic (patently false). Perhaps I should not be as surprised as I am that those who oppose my receiving the Adorno Prize would seek recourse to such scurrilous and unfounded charges to make their point. I am a scholar who gained an introduction to philosophy through Jewish thought, and I understand myself as defending and continuing a Jewish ethical tradition that includes figures such as Martin Buber and Hannah Arendt. I received a Jewish education in Cleveland, Ohio at The Temple under the tutelage of Rabbi Daniel Silver where I developed strong ethical views on the basis of Jewish philosophical thought. I learned, and came to accept, that we are called upon by others, and by ourselves, to respond to suffering and to call for its alleviation. But to do this, we have to hear the call, find the resources by which to respond, and sometimes suffer the consequences for speaking out as we do. I was taught at every step in my Jewish education that it is not acceptable to stay silent in the face of injustice. Such an injunction is a difficult one, since it does not tell us exactly when and how to speak, or how to speak in a way that does not produce a new injustice, or how to speak in a way that will be heard and registered in the right way. My actual position is not heard by these detractors, and perhaps that should not surprise me, since their tactic is to destroy the conditions of audibility.

I studied philosophy at Yale University and continued to consider the questions of Jewish ethics throughout my education. I remain grateful for those ethical resources, for the formation that I had, and that animates me still. It is untrue, absurd, and painful for anyone to argue that those who formulate a criticism of the State of Israel is anti-Semitic or, if Jewish, self-hating. Such charges seek to demonize the person who is articulating a critical point of view and so disqualify the viewpoint in advance. It is a silencing tactic: this person is unspeakable, and whatever they speak is to be dismissed in advance or twisted in such a way that it negates the validity of the act of speech. The charge refuses to consider the view, debate its validity, consider its forms of evidence, and derive a sound conclusion on the basis of listening to reason. The charge is not only an attack on persons who hold views that some find objectionable, but it is an attack on reasonable exchange, on the very possibility of listening and speaking in a context where one might actually consider what another has to say. When one set of Jews labels another set of Jews “anti-Semitic”, they are trying to monopolize the right to speak in the name of the Jews. So the allegation of anti-Semitism is actually a cover for an intra-Jewish quarrel.



In the United States, I have been alarmed by the number of Jews who, dismayed by Israeli politics, including the occupation, the practices of indefinite detention, the bombing of civilian populations in Gaza, seek to disavow their Jewishness. They make the mistake of thinking that the State of Israel represents Jewishness for our times, and that if one identifies as a Jew, one supports Israel and its actions. And yet, there have always been Jewish traditions that oppose state violence, that affirm multi-cultural co-habitation, and defend principles of equality, and this vital ethical tradition is forgotten or sidelined when any of us accept Israel as the basis of Jewish identification or values. So, on the one hand, Jews who are critical of Israel think perhaps they cannot be Jewish anymore of Israel represents Jewishness; and on the other hand, those who seek to vanquish anyone who criticizes Israel equate Jewishness with Israel as well, leading to the conclusion that the critic must be anti-Semitic or, if Jewish, self-hating. My scholarly and public efforts have been directed toward getting out of this bind. In my view, there are strong Jewish traditions, even early Zionist traditions, that value co-habitation and that offer ways to oppose violence of all kinds, including state violence. It is most important that these traditions be valued and animated for our time – they represent diasporic values, struggles for social justice, and the exceedingly important Jewish value of “repairing the world” (Tikkun).

It is clear to me that the passions that run so high on these issues are those that make speaking and hearing very difficult. A few words are taken out of context, their meaning distorted, and they then come to label or, indeed, brand an individual. This happens to many people when they offer a critical view of Israel – they are branded as anti-Semites or even as Nazi collaborators; these forms of accusation are meant to establish the most enduring and toxic forms of stigmatization and demonization. They target the person by taking the words out of context, inverting their meanings and having them stand for the person; indeed, they nullify the views of that person without regard to the content of those views. For those of us who are descendants of European Jews who were destroyed in the Nazi genocide (my grandmother’s family was destroyed in a small village south of Budapest), it is the most painful insult and injury to be called complicitous with the hatred of Jews or to be called self-hating. And it is all the more difficult to endure the pain of such an allegation when one seeks to affirm what is most valuable in Judaism for thinking about contemporary ethics, including the ethical relation to those who are dispossessed of land and rights of self-determination, to those who seek to keep the memory of their oppression alive, to those who seek to live a life that will be, and must be, worthy of being grieved. I contend that these values all derive from important Jewish sources, which is not to say that they are only derived from those sources. But for me, given the history from which I emerge, it is most important as a Jew to speak out against injustice and to struggle against all forms of racism. This does not make me into a self-hating Jew. It makes me into someone who wishes to affirm a Judaism that is not identified with state violence, and that is identified with a broad-based struggle for social justice.

My remarks on Hamas and Hezbollah have been taken out of context and badly distort my established and continuing views. I have always been in favor of non-violent political action, and this principle has consistently characterized my views. I was asked by a member of an academic audience a few years ago whether I thought Hamas and Hezbollah belonged to “the global left" and I replied with two points. My first point was merely descriptive: those political organizations define themselves as anti-imperialist, and anti-imperialism is one characteristic of the global left, so on that basis one could describe them as part of the global left. My second point was then critical: as with any group on the left, one has to decide whether one is for that group or against that group, and one needs to critically evaluate their stand. I do not accept or endorse all groups on the global left. Indeed, these very remarks followed a talk that I gave that evening which emphasized the importance of public mourning and the political practices of non-violence, a principle that I elaborate and defend in three of my recent books: Precarious Life, Frames of War, and Parting Ways. I have been interviewed on my non-violent views by Guernica and other on-line journals, and those views are easy to find, if one wanted to know where I stand on such issues. I am in fact sometimes mocked by members of the left who support forms of violent resistance who think I fail to understand those practices. It is true: I do not endorse practices of violent resistance and neither do I endorse state violence, cannot, and never have. This view makes me perhaps more naïve than dangerous, but it is my view. So it has always seemed absurd to me that my comments were taken to mean that I support or endorse Hamas and Hezbollah! I have never taken a stand on either organization, just as I have never supported every organization that is arguably part of the global left – I am not unconditionally supportive of all groups that currently constitute the global left. To say that those organizations belong to the left is not to say that they should belong, or that I endorse or support them in any way.

Two further points. I do support the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement in a very specific way. I reject some versions and accept others. For me, BDS means that I oppose investments in companies that make military equipment whose sole purpose is to demolish homes. It means as well that I do not speak at Israeli institutions unless they take a strong stand against the occupation. I do not accept any version of BDS that discriminates against individuals on the basis of their national citizenship, and I maintain strong collaborative relationships with many Israeli scholars. One reason I can endorse BDS and not endorse Hamas and Hezbollah is that BDS is the largest non-violent civic political movement seeking to establish equality and the rights of self-determination for Palestinians. My own view is that the peoples of those lands, Jewish and Palestinian, must find a way to live together on the condition of equality. Like so many others, I long for a truly democratic polity on those lands and I affirm the principles of self-determination and co-habitation for both peoples, indeed, for all peoples. And my wish, as is the wish of an increasing number of Jews and non-Jews, is that the occupation come to an end, that violence of all kinds cease, and that the substantial political rights of all people in that land be secured through a new political structure.

Two last notes: The group that is sponsoring this call is the Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, a misnomer at best, that claims on its website that “Islam” is an “inherently anti-semetic (sic) religion.” It is not, as The Jerusalem Post has reported, a large group of Jewish scholars in Germany, but an international organization with a base in Australia and California. They are a right-wing organization and so part of an intra-Jewish war. Ex-board member Gerald Steinberg is known for attacking human rights organizations in Israel as well as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Their willingness to include Israeli infractions of human rights apparently makes them also eligible for the label, “anti-Semitic.”

Finally, I am not an instrument of any “NGO”: I am on the advisory board of Jewish Voice for Peace, a member of Kehillah Synagogue in Oakland, California, and an executive member of Faculty for Israeli-Palestinian Peace in the US and The Jenin Theatre in Palestine. My political views have ranged over a large number of topics, and have not been restricted to the Middle East or the State of Israel. Indeed, I have written about violence and injustice in other parts of the world, focusing mainly in wars waged by the United States. I have also written on violence against transgendered people in Turkey, psychiatric violence, torture in Guantanamo, and about police violence against peaceful protestors in the U.S, to name a few. I have also written against anti-Semitism in Germany and against racial discrimination in the United States.


About Judith Butler Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature and the Co-director of the Program of Critical Theory at the University of California, Berkeley. She also is Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland. She has written many books, including most recently The Power of Religion in Public Life.
View all posts by Judith Butler →

Harper & co moving against War Resisters

Urgent Appeal - Harper & co moving against War Resisters

 
        War Resisters Support Campaign - Vancouver




URGENT APPEAL for funds to assist Iraq War resisters facing deportation - please share widely
Dear Friends of War Resisters:

After a period of calm in the cases of U.S. Iraq War resisters, things are quickly coming to a head.

War resister Kimberly Rivera and her family will receive a decision in their case in a few days and they face imminent deportation to the United States. Another war resister has been told to complete all of the submissions for his case by September 20th and to expect a decision shortly afterwards. Many other resisters are awaiting decisions on Humanitarian & Compassionate applications or spousal sponsorships. It appears that these decisions will now start coming in quickly.

Today, we are urgently appealing to you for financial help to assist with this crucial phase of the fight to win asylum for war resisters.

In spite of two motions passed in the House of Commons calling on the government to allow war resisters to stay in Canada, thousands of letters and petitions, and support across the country for war resisters, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney continue to fight to have every U.S. war resister removed from Canada.

Minister Kenney has had Citizenship & Immigration Canada lawyers intervene in the individual hearings and court cases of war resisters. He publicly labelled them "bogus" refugees, biasing the decisions in their cases. And he took the unprecedented step of issuing a bulletin to all Immigration Officers requiring them to red-flag applications that involve war resisters, labeling them as 'criminally inadmissible'. (http://resisters.ca/operational-bulletin-202/)

Faith communities, human rights organizations, refugee rights groups and thousands of Canadians have called on the Minister to implement the motions passed in Parliament, or, at a minimum, to allow the individual cases to be heard on their own merits – the same free and independent consideration that Minister Kenney insists was given to Conrad Black.


The only reason that U.S. Iraq War resisters have been able to stay in Canada as long as they have is because of the tremendous support they have received from Canadians for their courageous decision to stand up against a war that was internationally recognized as illegal and immoral.

In the coming days and weeks we will be asking supporters to once again take action to let the government know that Canadians still support the war resisters and believe as strongly as ever that they should be allowed to stay.

But we also urgently need funds. We are fighting a federal government that has unlimited resources, and they are dropping a deportation order on the eve of a long weekend, with Parliament not sitting, with possibly only days before the Riveras face removal. To build a public campaign in such a short period of time, we will need to pull out all stops to demand that the federal government not deport any war resisters.

Nobody deserves to spend even a single day in jail for making a conscientious decision not to participate in the Iraq War.

We hope you will give as generously as you can. A victory for U.S. war resisters in Canada will be a major victory for peace and justice, and for the kind of Canada we want this country to be.

Thank you, as always, for your past and ongoing support. See below for information on how to donate.

In peace and solidarity,
War Resisters Support Campaign
www.resisters.ca
-----------

Here’s how to donate:
1. Donate online by going here:
http://resisters.chipin.com

2. Donate by cheque:
To mail us a donation, please make a cheque payable to the War Resisters Support Campaign and mail it to:

War Resisters Support Campaign
Box 13, 427 Bloor Street West
Toronto, ON M5S 1X7
CANADA



War Resisters Support Campaign
Vancouver

http://vancouverwarresisters.org

Tel: 604-349-5027

c/o 1143 E Pender St
Vancouver BC V6A 1W6

Haiti, MINUSTAH, and the Crisis Group Report


Crisis Group report on MINUSTAH is a whitewash, not remedy, for Haiti’s ills 

by Roger Annis, Kevin Edmonds - Haiti Liberte

The think-tank International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a 28-page report on the UN Mission to Stabilize Haiti (MINUSTAH) on Aug. 2, 2012. Entitled “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making An Effective Transition,” the report’s central recommendation is that the military occupation regime should remain in Haiti for at least another five years.

This is the sixth report the ICG has produced on Haiti since the January 2010 earthquake. The organization has shown a capacity for frank and unbiased opinion. Its study on shelter and housing issued in June 2011, for example, criticized the Haitian government and its international sponsors for utterly failing to meet the desperate housing needs of Haitians.

In this latest report, however, the group accepts without question the presence of MINUSTAH and its claim to have the best interests of Haitians at heart. The report amounts to a political whitewash that misrepresents the political circumstances that brought the mission to Haiti in 2004 and has kept it there ever since.

MINUSTAH’s origins and achievements

As its name suggests, the ICG studies countries deemed to be destabilizing the international political order. It has 130 staff around the world. Its board of trustees is comprised of establishment political, business, and media figures, including chairperson Thomas Pickering, former U.S. Undersecretary of State and Ambassador to the U.N., and president Louise Arbour, a Canadian and former Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

On page one, the report says: “MINUSTAH’s principal mandate was to establish a secure and stable environment within which Haitian constitutional and political processes could take place.” Toward this end, it has supported to the Haitian National Police (PNH), maintained “rule of law and public safety,” assisted in organizing elections, and promoted and protected human rights, the report says, concluding that “MINUSTAH’s contribution to generally improved security conditions is recognized both in Haiti and abroad.”

Further on, we read: “Political violence has significantly diminished” since 2004. The mission has assisted, “two national elections (2006 and 2010/11) which restored constitutional rule.”

Disaster relief is listed as one of MINUSTAH’s accomplishments, although the force has come under intense criticism in Haiti for its relatively feeble contribution to humanitarian relief. Most of its huge annual budget of over $800 million is spent on policing and other forms of “security.”

The report says the economic outlook is “still encouraging,” with 6% growth foreseen for 2012, though it notes that the “Open for business” policy of the government of President Michel Martelly and Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe “will take time and requires a broad political consensus.” The latter is patently absent.

An opposite view of Haiti’s economic future was recently published (in French) by Haitian economist Camille Chalmers. Entitled “The Economic Balance Sheet of Reconstruction,” his article looks at the statistical trends in Haiti’s economy and concludes that the “figures show the impossibility of generating sustained growth” under Haiti’s current economic and political regime.

The real history

The International Crisis Group’s skewed interpretation of MINUSTAH’s origin goes right back to its first report on the subject in November 2004. There, we read: “In early 2004, after several years of fruitless diplomatic efforts to bridge political polarization, Haiti was again convulsed by political violence. Pressured particularly by France and the U.S., Aristide left the country on 29 February.”

This is a misleadingly polite description of a violent coup d’etat against the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and all the other institutions of elected government of the country. Washington then installed an illegal and unconstitutional regime (“transitional government of technocrats” in ICG-speak) which, in the words of a 2004 human rights study by U.S. attorney Thomas Griffin, unleashed a “whirlwind of violence” against Haiti’s poor majority attempting to resist the coup, fully backed by the military violence of the newly-created MINUSTAH.

The U.S., France, and Canada provided vital military and political assistance to the coup and the illegal “technocrat” regime. These three nations then proposed MINUSTAH to the UN Security Council in order to disguise as international “peace-keeping” their military take-over of Haiti.

MINUSTAH has been in the country ever since. Composed of police and soldiers from over 50 countries around the world, the majority of its foot soldiers are from Latin America.

The ICG praises MINUSTAH for its role in facilitating Haiti’s elections. Yet the mission and the troika that stands behind it have financed and provided essential technical support to elections that have excluded Haiti’s most vital political forces, most notably the Lavalas Family party founded by Aristide in 1996. The party won a decisive victory in the last truly free election in Haiti, in 2000, but has been excluded from every election since then.

What’s more, the elections of 2009, 2010 and 2011, which the ICG so highly praised, scored modern history’s lowest participation rates for Haiti and, indeed, for the entire hemisphere.

The ICG concedes some possible wrongdoing by MINUSTAH — notably its conduct in recklessly introducing the cholera bacteria via its Nepalese contingent in October 2010 — but its overriding concern is for the force’s reputation. The ICG cites an April 2012 report by UN independent expert on human rights, Michel Forst, saying that further stalling on accepting responsibility for cholera’s introduction “will do nothing to promote a good understanding of the activities of MINUSTAH.”

Echoing recent U.S. and European Union declarations, the ICG says the next vital step for Haiti is the formation of a permanent electoral council to hold national and local elections. Most of Haiti’s parliamentarians and civil society have denounced this project, now championed by Martelly. They call for a provisional electoral council instead, saying a permanent one would be arrived at unconstitutionally and would reinforce the exclusion of Haiti’s poor majority from political life.

The MINUSTAH record

It is difficult to square the ICG’s positive interpretation of MINUSTAH’s record. It’s been more than eight years since the coup d’etat and more than two years since an international earthquake relief program promised billions of dollars of aid to multiple international agencies in Haiti. Yet a “strategy for the urban poor, including displaced persons in camps and post-earthquake informal communities, is still missing,” the report says.

The ICG also flags the “chronic failure (by successive Haitian governing regimes) to tackle poverty, inequalities and exclusion, which endanger most of the population.”

After expressing concern over how the cholera epidemic will hurt MINUSTAH’s reputation, the report says that accountability for cholera (including establishing clean water delivery systems) is now in the hands of the Pan American Health Organization. It says a decision was reached during the recent Rio+20 Earth Summit to fund clean water systems in Haiti with $2 billion. But like so many other sentiments expressed at Rio+20, this promise will likely fall short unless decisive international pressure is brought to bear.

The ICG made no other mention of compensation owed to Haiti’s cholera victims despite a suit pending against MINUSTAH for its responsibility.

And while the ICG is happy to reach back into Haitian history to buttress its pro-MINUSTAH arguments, it conveniently ignores concerns expressed for years about the threat of waterborne diseases to the Haitian people. Of note is Partners In Health’s 2008 report that slammed, in particular, the coup-backing countries of 2004 for having blocked international loans to Aristide’s second government to build potable water systems. (See Wòch nan soley: The denial of the right to water in Haiti.)

The ICG’s defense of MINUSTAH’s performance in establishing “security” is not very convincing. The force’s first tasks, we read, were disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former soldiers of the Haitian army that was disbanded in 1995 (these were the core of the paramilitaries that staged the 2004 coup); neutralization of urban gangs; curbs on crime; and a purge of the PNH. “None of these goals have been fully achieved,” we read.

Nor has police corruption been tackled. The report says that 137 cases of police corruption or misconduct have not been investigated. The body in charge of such cases, the Higher Council of the National Police, has been chaired by none other than Haiti’s succession of prime ministers, that is, the products of the supposedly successful elections midwifed by MINUSTAH.

The ICG report’s long Part Three is devoted to MINUSTAH’s “exit strategy”, but on pages 18-19, we read a long litany of failings of the force and the Haitian government in laying the necessary groundwork. Rule of law, prison and judicial improvements, legal aid services, social services — progress on all is deemed absent or lacking.

Concerning MINUSTAH’s accountability, the ICG notes that MINUSTAH never created a “Claims Commission” that would allow Haitians to seek redress for alleged wrongdoings. Yet this was one of the conditions contained in the Status of Forces Agreement that MINUSTAH signed with Haiti’s de facto regime in 2004.

“There is no transition or exit strategy as yet (for MINUSTAH),” the ICG concludes. “The UN will need to remain in Haiti for a long time.”

Contradictions in the ICG report

The ICG report is full of other contradictions. For the ICG, Haiti is undergoing five transitions — from violence to reconciliation and peace; non-democratic culture to a democratic society; a failed to a modern national state; poverty and social injustice to a thriving and equitable economy; and from a country destroyed by an earthquake to one “not only being rebuilt but ideally transformed.” (page 4)

“A humanitarian imperative amid ongoing political instability, sporadic violence and recurring natural disasters continues to suggest the need for a strong international presence,” says the report, and MINUSTAH must “ensure that a phased withdrawal is linked to stronger institutions and progress toward lasting stability and development.”

The goal in post-earthquake Haiti is “support for the holding of elections to put in place a government and thus speed up reconstruction.”

All of this makes clear that, in the minds of the report’s writers at least, human development is required before “security” can be achieved. But the ICG then incongruously acknowledges that MINUSTAH spurns all responsibility to assist human development. The report says it is a “popular misconception” to think that MINUSTAH can shift from being a policing agency to development agency: “MINUSTAH’s mandate does not include development as its priority.”

So the MINUSTAH formula, endorsed by the ICG, turns in circles — policing, and no development; and no development, but policing.

Another contradiction is the report’s strong praise for MINUSTAH’s assistance to elections. On page 6, it says such support is “essential” but, on page 22, recognizes that it undermines the credibility of electoral outcomes: “International financing of more than half of the costs of elections, continuing technical assistance to the CEP [Provisional Electoral Council] and MINUSTAH’s logistics involvement made it easy for some Haitians, particularly those unhappy about Lavalas’ absence from several elections, to criticize MINUSTAH and the international community for interference in the country’s politics.”

The ICG calls President Martelly’s plan to revive the human rights-violating Haitian army “questionable” but then asserts that “many Haitians” support the plan. Its cited source for this assertion is one, unnamed Haitian government official. But Robert Muggah, former director of the Small Arms Survey, found overwhelming opposition to resurrecting the army during extensive surveys he and other researchers conducted and published in an October 2011 report.

Finally, the ICG report makes a deeply biased assessment of the Lavalas Family party which it calls one of three key “dangers” to “reconciliation” in Haiti. The other two dangers are “the Martelly presidency’s Duvalierist imprints”(!) and “the reappearance of former members of a once brutal army” (whose restitution was previously termed only “questionable”).

Furthermore, actions by Lavalas-inspired political representatives in Haiti’s Parliament are described as having “slowed government progress” in the first year of Martelly’s presidency.

Conclusion

In 2011, an international group of scholars, doctors, and activists published through the Harvard School of Public Health a comprehensive review of the deeply troubling, post-earthquake human rights record of MINUSTAH, entitled “MINUSTAH: Keeping the Peace or Conspiring Against It?”

A writer of this article was a co-author of that White Paper, which was a response to the premise that if MINUSTAH leaves Haiti, the country will collapse into a spiral of violence from which it will never escape. Edmond Mulet, MINUSTAH’s former chief, said the country would “just fall apart” if MINUSTAH were to leave. He described Haiti as “a society, community, a nation that has committed collective suicide” due its alleged political infighting. (Mulet is Guatemalan.)

The Harvard report notes that there are higher levels of “insecurity” and violence in neighboring Caribbean states such as Jamaica, Trinidad and the Virgin Islands, as well as many U.S. cities, than in Haiti. This nullifies MINUSTAH’s principal justification.

In fact, much of Haiti’s instability is the direct result of MINUSTAH’s ongoing human rights abuses, the White Paper contends. “MINUSTAH’s continued presence is justified by the levels of unrest, or potential for unrest, in Haiti,” the paper notes. “Since the earthquake, the only significant civil discord in the country has targeted MINUSTAH for introducing cholera or failing to respond to IDP [internally displaced persons] camp conditions, or expressed anger over fraudulent elections. MINUSTAH responded to these peaceful protests with violence, including tear gassing students and IDPs, assaulting international journalists, shooting at children, and even killing peaceful protestors.”

Thanks to WikiLeaked revelations published last year in the weekly Haiti Liberté newspaper and The Nation magazine, we have learned from former U.S. ambassador to Haiti Janet Sanderson that “the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti is an indispensable tool in realizing core USG [U.S. Government] policy interests in Haiti.” MINUSTAH is, she said, “a financial and regional security bargain for the USG.”

Furthermore, MINUSTAH’s definition of developing an environment of political stability is highly exclusionary and indeed helps destabilize the country. In that revealing Oct. 1, 2008 secret cable, Sanderson said that a “premature departure of MINUSTAH would leave the [Haitian] government… vulnerable to… resurgent populist and anti-market economy political forces — reversing gains of the last two years”.

MINUSTAH has carried out a series of human rights violations resulting in a loss of Haitian sovereignty, stability, dignity, and life. Its record of engaging in acts of extrajudicial murder, sexual assault, suppressing peaceful political protests, undermining democracy, and introducing cholera into Haiti are more than enough grounds for revoking its mandate. Yet for geopolitical and economic reasons, this does not happen.

“At such a crucial point in Haiti’s history, and with years of failures, inaction, repression, and human rights violations documented, it is time that MINUSTAH respect the Haitian people’s wishes, and the wishes of many of its members’ citizens, and withdraw from Haiti,” the Harvard report states. “Arguments of greater instability cannot justify the current abuse and violence against Haitians.”

In short, the Harvard White Paper stands in sharp counterpoint to the ICG report and arrives at an opposite conclusion: “Just as concern of post-MINUSTAH instability cannot justify a single violation of a Haitian’s rights by an occupying force, no solution to Haiti’s problems can include foreign, armed military on its soil. If the UN and its members want to support Haiti, MINUSTAH’s nearly one billion USD yearly budget should be put toward sanitation, shelter, health, infrastructure, and education, not arms and soldiers that result in death, sexual assault, and the subversion of democracy.”

Roger Annis is a coordinator of the Canada Haiti Action Network in Vancouver BC and publishes on Rabble.ca. Kevin Edmonds is a graduate student at the University of Toronto and an author of the 2011 MINUSTAH: Keeping the Peace or Conspiring Against It? He writes a blog, The Other Side of Paradise on the NACLA website.

Alex Cooley on Great Games, Local Rules in Central Asia


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Alex Cooley

Great Games, Local Rules: Six Questions for Alex Cooley

by Scott Horton

Through much of modern history, Central Asia has been a borderland between great empires that vied for influence within it. This came to an end with the Soviet period, which plunged the region into isolation. Now, Barnard College professor Alex Cooley has taken a deep look at the post-Soviet era. 

In Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia, he finds a sometimes hostile, sometimes friendly rivalry, focused on security issues, between the United States, Russia, and China for influence in the region. I put six questions to Cooley about his new book:

1. You draw on the image of the Great Game in talking about how the United States, Russia, and China have vied for influence in Central Asia. But explain how this Great Game is different from the one portrayed by Kipling?

The original Great Game—or at least, how it’s popularly mythologized—was perceived as a zero-sum competition between the Russian and British empires for control over territory and access ways. The current political agendas of the United States, Russia, and China mostly differ from those of Russia and Britain in the nineteenth century, and these three powers can coexist, even in rivalry. But the biggest difference in the contemporary Great Games is that the objects of competition are themselves sovereign states, which allows them to play their external suitors off one another and try to use this economic and political support to consolidate their domestic power bases. The rulers of the Central Asian states have all become experts at brokering the interests and needs of external actors and channeling these actors’ resources to their own pockets and patronage networks.

These “local rules” have been so effective that almost all external actors now play by them, and even values-oriented actors like the United States and European Union now perceive that the region should be measured according to lower standards of democracy, governance, and human rights than, say, the Balkans or Eastern Europe.

2. You suggest that the United States, Russia, and China each approaches the issue of counterterrorism in Central Asia in different ways. Why did the region become such a hub for extraordinary renditions by all three powers, and how have they justified their actions?

For me, on the human rights front, Central Asia represents a region of “norm regression,” where counterterrorism has been cynically and ruthlessly used by the regimes to push back on civil liberties and crack down on all kinds of political opposition—not just Islamic militants. The exact purposes and legal justifications of United States, China, and Russia in cooperating with Central Asian security services have differed.

For the United States, a number of investigative reports suggest that contractors and private-security firms were transporting suspects between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, and that many of these suspects faced torture. But these actions, like the Bush Administration’s broader “war on terror,” remain clouded in secrecy and, as with the detainee camp at Guantánamo Bay and the black sites of Eastern Europe, an attempt was made to place them beyond the purview of international laws that apply to conventional wars.

For China, counterterrorism has focused on restricting the activities of Uighur groups and transferring key suspects back to China, as well as getting Central Asian states to monitor and mute domestic Uighur political and social organizations.

Russia has used the counterterrorism card even more cynically, using it to push for more security and intelligence cooperation with Central Asian states, and rendering political opponents back to Central Asia in order to curry favor with these regimes. Russia has also banned a number of organizations, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, that used to be legal, altering its 1990s status as a relative safe haven for Central Asian political opposition.

Unlike the United States, which, at least in the Bush years, viewed its actions as beyond the reach of the law, China and Russia have justified renditions and other counterterrorism activities with new regional conventions and antiterrorism treaties.

3. Since 2001, Central Asia has been viewed primarily as a logistics challenge for Americans focused on how to get supplies to U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan. How will the United States’ relations with the region change as it prepares to wind down its operations, withdrawing troops and equipment?

In the scandals involving foreign oil companies in Kazakhstan and the Manas fuel deals, external actors turned a blind eye to shadowy schemes and opaque contracts. As long as deals were successfully negotiated or, in the case of the Pentagon, fuel was provided, these principals had little cause to question their underlying arrangements. Local elites profited handsomely from many of these international transactions and invoked geopolitical competition as a means to leverage their position and demand more private goods. Moreover, these transactional forms have allowed U.S., Chinese, and Russian external actors the space to deny allegations that they directly promoted corruption, while giving local elites the means to personally benefit from these deals. They remain the most tangible embodiment of how the great powers and local elites have interfaced and cooperated
—From Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press, © 2012 Alexander Cooley
I think you already see signs of what withdrawal from Afghanistan will bring. First, we should recognize that the United States will still maintain a support presence in the region beyond 2014, which might prove a short-term boon to the Central Asian states, in terms of both reverse-transit fees and continuing security assistance. You’ll see more emphasis on special forces, border management, and counterterrorism, while border states will continue to wave the scepter of Taliban spillover to justify security and aid requests. The question of Manas remains open, but my guess is that an extension will be worked out with the Kyrgyz government that will alter the official status of the facility to emphasize its logistics role.

4. Uzbekistan is known to be in the market for military assistance from the NATO alliance operating in Afghanistan, and seems to be hoping that it will benefit from equipment left behind as allied forces leave the region. What issues does this desire raise, and how should the allies go about addressing them?

The Uzbeks have been pressing for equipment transfers for many years now, ever since negotiations began on the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). There are two relevant categories of transfers. The first, official arms purchases from the United States, is subject to special restrictions, including vetting procedures. However, what the Uzbeks are mostly pressing for is the other type of transfer: equipment from the Afghanistan theater that is being left behind. They seem especially interested in helicopters, as well as armored personnel carriers and night-vision equipment. As Karl Eikenberry, a former U.S. ambassador in Kabul, stated at a conference at Columbia University in April, the United States intends to leave behind as much as possible so as to cut down on reverse-transit costs. Uzbekistan clearly perceives an opportunity here.

One of the issues this raises relates to transparency. The U.S. military has been more open about what it will transfer to the Afghan National Army than about its negotiations with the Central Asian militaries. Another issue is whether the Uzbek security services genuinely require strengthening. Are they behaving, both within and outside of their borders, in a manner consistent with international standards? I believe it’s best to have these debates now as opposed to in two years time, when the process is a fait accompli.

5. You raise contract corruption as an important issue in the relationships between the great powers and Central Asia, and you present some striking examples involving the United States. Can you propose some “lessons learned” from U.S. contracting operations in the region?

The congressional investigation into the Pentagon’s fuel-contracting process at Manas Air Base found no “smoking gun” of corruption, but it raised important red flags by showing how the Defense Logistics Agency had cozied up to certain mysterious offshore companies with no legal history or public corporate profile, giving them a number of no-bid contract extensions. Some DLA officials have since come to appreciate that the fuel contracts became a much broader symbol of U.S. support for political strongmen and their shady governance practices, and that such perceptions could jeopardize the legal standing of the operations at Manas.

What I take issue with more specifically is when U.S. officials argue that these logistics contracts at Manas or in the Northern Distribution Network, which in fact encourage rent-seeking by elites, are somehow also promoting economic development in the region. In the Giffen case (or “Kazakhgate”), the judge accepted, remarkably, the defendant’s claim that his role in the flow of money from oil companies to Kazakhstani government officials was justified because he was serving as an asset for U.S. intelligence and the State Department. That suggests at least tacit sanctioning of the deals in question.

More broadly, Central Asia is emblematic of the very particular way that we now view international corruption in high-profile commercial contracts—we assume it’s an internal matter located mainly in the primary contracts and the procurement process itself. Yet, as I hope I show in the book, the real corruption opportunities lie in the subcontracts. Moreover, many energy deals involved newly registered offshore companies as vehicles for facilitating payoffs to elites. Unless we take seriously the transnational dimension of money laundering and the problem of offshore vehicles, we won’t make much headway into fighting commercial corruption in this or any other region.

6. You write that in the competition for influence, there are “no losers,” but that China, which has maintained the lowest profile of the three great powers active in Central Asia, has been the “big winner.” Why?

We need to judge the success of the external powers based on their own strategic goals. So the United States has been mostly successful, as it has maintained the logistics networks and supporting cooperative ties necessary for its Afghanistan operations, despite hiccups such as Uzbekistan’s eviction of the United States from the Karshi-Khanabad air base in 2005, or the 2009 bidding war initiated by Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev over the Manas air base. Russia, too, wielded soft power effectively and reemerged as a regional hegemon. Still, it risks the erosion of its prestige if it presses too hard, as it did with Uzbekistan, to curtail the autonomy of states within organizations like the CSTO or the Customs Union.

But China’s emergence in the region has been remarkable. In just over a decade, it has concluded border agreements with its Central Asian neighbors and secured their cooperation in cracking down on regional Uighur-related violence. Economically, it is now the region’s largest trading partner and, for poorer Central Asian countries, the main source of investment and development assistance. It has also completed major new oil and gas pipelines to bring Central Asian energy eastward. Europe has been talking for decades about proposed Asian pipelines, like Nabucco, that might break the Russian transit monopoly. But the Chinese accomplished this quickly and decisively. Moreover, the very fact that the China–Central Asia pipeline consists of three separate joint ventures between the China National Petroleum Corporation and the host governments makes Beijing the clear arbitrator of any future regional pipeline disputes.

So overall, while the Chinese would like to see even more economic integration and free trade between the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, they have successfully accomplished a number of strategic goals in the region, all while downplaying their impact by publicly deferring to Russian primacy and jawboning about an alleged strategic partnership. It has been a smart and effective way of operating, and I’m not sure Moscow has an effective response.

How North America Impoverishes Latin America


U.S. POLICIES CONTRIBUTED TO POVERTY IN LATIN AMERICA

by Sherwood Ross


The United States has worked across Latin America to enrich private clients at the expense of the pauperized masses, Professor of Sociology Emeritus James Petras of Binghamton University, N.Y., charges.


“Never in the 20th Century (1990-2001) were so many lucrative public monopolies transferred to private national and foreign investors, in so many countries and covering such a vast...array of sectors in less than a decade,” Petras asserts in his book, “Rulers and Ruled in the U.S. Empire”(Clarity).


Washington backed clients Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil, Carlos Salinas in Mexico, and Carlos Menem in Argentina. Menem privatized more than 1,000 public enterprises by executive decree; Cardoso privatized the most lucrative state enterprises, and Salinas privatized over 110 public enterprises, Petras reckoned.


What’s more, Salinas opened Mexico’s borders to subsidized U.S. agricultural exports that ruined over 1.5 million Mexican farmers and his policies “facilitated the U.S. takeover of Mexico’s retail trade, real estate, agriculture, industry, banking and communications sector,” Petras wrote.


In Brazil, Cardoso literally gave away the Vale del Doce iron mine for $400 million when its market value in 2007 was over $10 billion and it enjoyed annual returns exceeding 25 per cent, Petras pointed out.


He notes that Mexico and Brazil are the two Latin nations having the most billionaires. The wealth of just 38 Latin families and/or individuals exceeds that of 250 million Latin Americans, Petras says. In fact, in Mexico, the income of 0.000001 percent of the population exceeds the combined income of 40-million Mexicans!


“The principal cause of poverty in Latin America is the very conditions that facilitate the growth of billionaires,” Petras writes. In Mexico, the privatization of the telecommunication sector at rock bottom prices resulted in the quadrupling of wealth for Carlos Slim Helu, the third richest man in the world with a net worth of $49 billion. Two fellow Mexican billionaires, Alfredo Harp Helu and Roberto Hernandez Ramirez, benefited from the privatization of banks and their subsequent de-nationalization with the sale of Banamex to Citicorp. (Carlos Slim Helu ranks today as the richest man in the world.)


“Privatization, financial de-regulation and de-nationalization were the key operating principles of U.S. foreign economic policies implemented in Latin America by the IMP and the World Bank, and dictated the fundamental conditions shaping any loans or debt re-negotiations there,” Petras writes.


The U.S. gets its way economically primarily by backing “the military dictators and neo-liberal politicians who set upthe billionaire-oriented economic models,” Petras explains.


Countries of surging billionaires, he points out, “produce burgeoning poverty, submerging living standards. The making of billionaires means the unmaking of civil society---the weakening of social solidarity, protective social legislation, pensions, vacations, public health programs and education.” Indeed, many of these crippling outcomes are produced when former union leaders or acknowledged Marxist change their stripes once elected.


“The period of greatest decline in living standards in Latin America...coincides with the dismantling of the nationalist, populist, and communist economies,” Petras notes. “Between 1980 and 2004, Latin America---more precisely Brazil, Argentina and Mexico---stagnated at 0 to 1 percent per capita growth.


Petras writes the reason for U.S. hostility toward President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela “is precisely because he is reversing the policies which create billionaires and mass poverty.”


Going back in Latin American history, Petras traces years in which the U.S. employed military force to put its favorites in power:


“Beginning with the U.S.-backed military coup in Brazil in 1964....Washington re-established its power and reversed the legislation and policies which adversely affected its big property holders and foreign policy.” Besides invading the Dominican Republic in 1965, America’s CIA backed military seizures of power in Bolivia, 1971, Uruguay, 1972-73, Chile,1973, Peru, 1975, and Argentina, 1976.


Petras says, ”All the new dictatorships received large-scale funding from the U.S. government, easy access to loans from the World Bank and IMF (thus starting the massive debt cycle) for many dubious ventures in exchange for repressing all nationalist, socialist, democratic and popular opposition.”


# (Sherwood Ross is a Miami-based public relations consultant for good causes who formerly worked for wire services and major dailies. Reach him at sherwoodross10@gmail.com).

Little-Known Pipeline Paves Way for Enbridge Under Radar of British Columbians

by Laila Yuile


If there is one thing that can be said about all the attention directed to Enbridge's Northern Gateway Project, it is that it's provided ample distraction for other projects and issues to move along without getting the same ass-kicking Enbridge is.

Take for example, the Pacific Trails Pipeline project ( also referred to as the KSL line). With minimal media coverage during the approval process, it has by and large flown completely under the radar of most British Columbians. That's a damn shame in my opinion, and I'm going to tell you why.

First of all, this pipeline is owned by Apache Corporation, Encana and EOG Resources (formerly Enron). It is going to be transporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Kitimat in an expanded 42-inch diameter pipe and will assist in driving expansion of fracking in northeastern B.C., something the Liberals are all over like flies on manure. Unfortunately for the people in that area of B.C., the NDP are right on board with fracking as well, with energy critic John Horgan extolling the virtues as he perceives them.

It's all the same old crap, in different piles: the pipeline, the LNG plant in Kitimat, expansion of fracking in B.C. and the proposed Site C dam -- something Christy Clark already admitted is needed to power LNG plants and expansion in B.C. We are rushing around trying to get resources to a Chinese market that has already bought up so many LNG supply contracts around the world, and is now showing signs of the same economic decline and crunch the rest of the world has been experiencing for far longer.

But wait, if that isn't contentious enough for you already, here's the real point you might not have known about yet. The Pacific Trails Pipeline runs from just north of Summit Lake (about 55 kms north of Prince George) to Kitimat... and a large portion of this pipeline right of way follows the same route Enbridge plans for the Northern Gateway pipeline.

In fact, Pacific Trails has already begun to clear the pipeline route this summer, logging and cutting brush and many fear this is going to pave the way for Enbridge and mitigate much of the environmental impact in this area -- and Enbridge has it all that much easier for a portion of their total route.
In May 2011, Damien Gillis reported on an interview Enbridge CEO Pat Daniels did with Fox News in which he said:
"We think we're in a very strong position with regard to exporting Canadian natural gas in particular. We're currently putting forward our credentials to the proponents - EOG, Apache, Shell and others - that are working on moving Western Canadian natural gas out to the West Coast; and we would hope to be able to see some synergies with the right-of-way that we're working on with our Gateway pipeline out to the West Coast. So, yes, we're very interested in doing that and we would hope to be the pipeline provider for one or both of those alternatives. (emphasis added)"

While still largely unreported by major media outlets, there has already been physical opposition to the Pacific Trails Pipeline by the Unist'ot'en and the Likhts'amisyu of the Wet'suwet'en Nation, who evicted and escorted out Pacific Trails Pipeline drillers and their equipment back in November.

They continue to protest this pipeline and others that cross their territories and inevitably threaten the two main salmon spawning and food supply streams they rely on as the staple in their diet. These people don't go to Choices to buy eco-friendly organics, they live off the land -- the very land both these pipelines cross and I believe you can toss Kinder Morgan in there too. This is their land, and the land is as essential to their way of life as the air we all breathe.

In fact, in the last couple of weeks, an action camp was hosted by the clans of the Wet'suwet'en Nation, a peaceful gathering of protest which was attended by Chris Johnson, a writer who was left profoundly impacted by the experience. In this exceptional blog post, he writes:
"If what we have been hearing from the Unis'tot'en and Lhe Lin Liyin is to be believed, and I believe them, they will be putting their bodies in the path of this pipeline, as I witnessed them doing when a CANFOR logging contractor attempted to pass through the territory on the way to cut trees for the right-of-way for the pipeline...

"This is your wake-up call."

With active clearing already begun for the Pacific Trails/KSL line, the time has come for all British Columbians to inform themselves about what's going on and what they can do about it. This pipeline has already been approved, without a lot of fuss or fight, and this portion of the line is crucial to Enbridge who must already have an agreement in place with the partners behind Pacific Trails to use the same right of way in this area.

It might even be that if Enbridge's bitumen line is tanked, they will be in place to offer the option of LNG transport... another synergy between partners? This pipeline is a key part of all the fracking expansion in B.C. and yet so many British Columbians don't even know it was approved.

I don't hold all the answers.

I support sustainable and environmentally sound resource extraction and believe this can be achieved -- if the dedication and values are there in government to set the standard for such. Unfortunately, our governments have not been in line with this goal, seemingly willing to sell B.C. to the highest bidders and for that reason I do believe the people must set the standard and ensure their lands are protected, at any cost.

"Only when the last tree has died and the last river been poisoned and the last fish been caught will we realise we cannot eat money." ~Cree Proverb

(This was originally posted at www.lailayuile.com.)


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