Modus Operandi
By John Helmer - Dances with Bears
The source is the Federal Security Service (FSB), with supporting evidence from the Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Armenia, including at least five eye-witnesses and participants, plus telephone interceptions.
The politics of this evidence, and the timing of its publication now, are plain. The humanitarian grain export agreement, promoted by United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, has been manipulated by the Ukrainians and their NATO allies – excluding Turkey – to conceal weapons shipments for military operations against Russia.
Guterres did the same thing in his conduct of the negotiations to evacuate civilians held hostage in the bunkers of the Azovstal complex in Mariupol during the siege of April and May. Guterres lied in his direct talks with Russian officials then. He continued lying to them during the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) negotiations on the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant in September. His public lying led to the unprecedented condemnation of the Secretary-General by the Russian Foreign Ministry on September 30; Guterres was dismissed as “an instrument of propaganda and pressure on member states”.
In the newly reported interpretation of the FSB’s evidence, the shipping links have been exposed between Odessa and the Danube River ports of Romania and Bulgaria, opening for public discussion in Moscow the future of Odessa in the operational planning of the Russian General Staff. This is to be decided by the Stavka before President Vladimir Putin leaves for the G20 summit conference in Bali on November 15-16, at which President Joseph Biden and Vladimir Zelensky will also be present.
Also obvious is what is missing from these operational reports from the FSB sources. So far there has been no publication of the evidence already gathered by the FSB and military intelligence on the M.O. for coordinating the movement of the truck with its explosive charge on the bridge and its movement in parallel with the fuel train, so that the detonation would coincide and strike the train, magnifying the impact on both road and rail structures.
Reports by Vzglyad analysts, Rafael Fakhrutdinov and Yevgeny Krutikov, follow; they have been translated into English without interpolation, explanation, or comment. Maps and other captioned illustrations have been added to their running text.
HOW THE BOMB WAS TRANSPORTED BY SEA FROM ODESSA
Source:https://vz.ru/
The terrorist attack on the Crimean Bridge forces Russia to take Odessa
The ‘Grain Deal’ helped Kiev organize a terrorist attack against the Crimean bridge
October 13, 2022
By Rafael Fakhrutdinov
The terrorist attack against the Crimean Bridge revealed a serious flaw for Russia’s security in the ‘grain deal’. That provided that vessels carrying grain would be inspected only in
the Turkish Straits. The ship carrying explosives which left Odessa was
able to safely enter the Danube River. This violation of the ‘grain
deal’ will not solve the problem – after leaving Zmeiny [Snake] Island,
Russia lost control over this sector of the Black Sea. What are the
options?
The Federal Security Service has revealed the organizer
and perpetrators of the terrorist attack on the Crimean Bridge – the
responsibility has been assigned to the head of military intelligence of
Ukraine Kirill Budanov. The FSB has also found out the route of the
explosive device which went off on the bridge on October 8.
The
first stage of this movement is of particular interest. In early August,
the dangerous cargo with a total weight of more than 22 tonnes,
camouflaged under rolls of construction film, was transported from the
seaport of Odessa along the Black Sea coast and up the Danube to the
Bulgarian river port of Ruse, located inland. ‘We see a gross violation
of the grain deal. The fact that a military cargo has left Odessa,
directed against the Russian Federation, is an obvious violation of the
agreement,’ said Deputy Head of the International Affairs Committee of
the Federation Council, Andrei Klimov.
Recall that the inspection of ships is undertaken in order
to exclude the transportation of military cargo. But the subtlety is
that the inspection is carried out only at the entrance and exit from
the Black Sea. The JCC groups that conduct the inspection are working in
harbours in the area of the Turkish Straits of the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles. But the vessel with the explosives ‘turned off’ much
earlier.
As the newspaper VZGLYAD has already noted,
the ship, which left Odessa for Ruse, moved on a coastal course along
the seashore, and then entered the Danube, where it proceeded through
Romanian territory to the Bulgarian port. The Ukraine supports active
navigation on the Danube, although this is hampered by the Ukrainian
mines installed at the beginning of the Special Military Operation near
Odessa and [since February 24] they have been drifting to the Danube
delta and out into the Black Sea. The cargo shipment was regulated by
the fact that on July 22 in Istanbul, Russia, Turkey and the UN signed
a memorandum of cooperation in the supply of Russian and Ukrainian
agricultural products to the markets. Ukraine has signed its part of the
agreement with Turkey and the UN. The ‘Grain deal’ was concluded for a
period of 120 days until November, with the possibility of extension.
Under
the terms of this agreement, a Joint Coordination Center (JCC) with the
participation of Russia, Turkey and the Ukraine operates in Istanbul to
monitor the departure of ships from Ukraine. The main thing to pay
attention to is that the JCC is charged with the inspection of ships,
in order to exclude the transportation of military cargo.
TURKISH NAVY IDENTIFICATION OF UKRAINIAN MINES IN THE BLACK SEA SINCE FEBRUARY
Source: https://turkishnavy.net// -- September 10, 2022
The main thing is that the vessel sailing from Odessa to Ruse was not
subject to verification by Turkish observers as part of the ‘grain
deal’. ‘We can’t check such vessels that go along the coast. Especially
if the ship was sailing under the Bulgarian flag. Two neighbouring NATO
countries, Romania and Bulgaria, are exploiting this,’ said military
expert Vasily Dandykin.
According to the Istanbul Agreements,
‘all activities in Ukrainian territorial waters are conducted under the
authority and responsibility of Ukraine” (point C of the “Initiatives
for the safe transportation of grain and food from Ukrainian ports”).
The Ukrainian side focuses on this point, which excludes external
control. Due to the lack of control, the cargo was delivered to
Bulgaria, and from there to Georgia by sea as a transit to Armenia. The
cargo was sealed and was not subject to Bulgarian or Georgian customs
inspection.
Website of the UN for the implementation of the grain agreement.
Russia did not have the opportunity to control the movement of the
vessel along the Black Sea coast from Odessa to the Danube estuary. This
is largely due to the terms of the grain agreement. In June, as a
gesture of goodwill, Russia withdrew its garrison from Zmeiny Island,
which occupies a strategically important position about 35 km east of
the mouth of the Danube. From Odessa to Zmeiny is about 120 km, and near
the island there is the regular shipping route between the Bulgarian
port of Varna and other ports of the western Black Sea region. ‘It has
been demonstrated to the world community that the Russian Federation
does not hinder the efforts of the UN to organize a humanitarian
corridor for the export of agricultural products from the territory of
Ukraine,’ RIA Novosti reported the statement by the Russian Defense
Ministry regarding the withdrawal of our military from the island. After
the evacuation of the garrison from Zmeiny, Ukraine resumed navigation
on the Danube.
“The military intelligence agency of Ukraine has
clearly calculated – why not take advantage of the situation when the
Odessa port is unblocked, and deals continue to be concluded with
Bulgaria in the field of construction and so on. What is not a
convenient moment? The fact that the ports have been unblocked is being
quietly used to carry out such operations,’ Semyon Bagdasarov, director
of the Center for the Study of the Middle East and Central Asia, said
air during the television program, Soloviev Live.
Theoretically,
Ukrainian military intelligence could well use a cargo ship with grain
going towards Istanbul, said Ivan Lizan, head of the analytical bureau
of the SONAR-2050 project. ‘The explosives could also have been
offloaded [at a concealed location] during the operation by disabling
the vessel transponder. After that, turn the transponder on – and the
ship would proceed to Istanbul, where representatives of the UN, Russia
and Turkey would have boarded it and checked the cargo ship for any
prohibited items, including explosives and weapons,’ Lizan said.
Altering
the regime of the ‘grain deal’ – for example, so that Turkey (as the
guarantor of the Istanbul Agreements) would have the opportunity to
inspect ships not in the Bosphorus, but immediately after they leave the
Ukrainian ports – would be problematic, says corresponding member of
the Academy of Military Sciences, Alexander Bartosh. ‘Can we, within
the framework of the grain deal, oblige Turkey to inspect all vessels
leaving the territorial waters of Ukraine, and check all ships? I think
this would be very difficult – Ankara itself will not agree to this,’
Bartosz told VZGLYAD. ‘Besides, before that, Turkey would have to hold
consultations with its NATO allies, and all this would take a very long
time.’
“Nevertheless, this should clearly become a topic for
negotiations between Russia and Turkey in the very near future. This is
because a terrorist attack was committed on Russian territory, in which
the Black Sea countries were involved,’ the interlocutor noted.
Presidents Putin and Erdogan, with their delegations, meeting in Astana on October 13.
According to Bagdasarov, it is necessary to go further and raise the
issue of terminating the ‘grain deal’, the validity period for which, we
add, will already expire in November. The expert recalled that Russia
has repeatedly criticized the quality of the implementation of these
agreements, Vladimir Putin pointed out that the poorest countries, which
should be the recipients of supplies, receive from 3% to 5% of all the
exported products. ‘A number of countries are interested in this grain
deal including Turkey as an intermediary. It is clear that Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, in receiving this grain, slightly improves his domestic
support rating on the eve of the elections scheduled for next year. Why
do we need this grain deal?’ the expert asked himself.
‘The
decision to withdraw from the grain deal after the circumstances have
been revealed will be made by the leadership of our country. At the same
time, it is obvious that the West, represented by the United States,
the EU and the UN, has not fulfilled its obligations under the deal,’
said Senator Konstantin Dolgov, former Russian Foreign Ministry
Commissioner for Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law, and deputy
Russian Permanent Representative to the UN.
But if we assume that
Russia will withdraw from the deal, then it will be quite difficult to
regain control of Zmeiny [Snake] Island and the north-west of the Black
Sea as a whole, Bartosh believes. ‘As for the control of the water area
in the Zmeiny area, the Russian military may stop some vessel for
inspection, but this will be an international scandal, since we do not
have an international mandate for such actions. It will also be
difficult to take this zone by military means, because it is being shot
through by Ukrainian anti–ship warfare means – mobile, disguised,’ the
expert points out. ‘They have not been suppressed, and if we could, we
probably would have attacked them earlier. In general, the
military-political leadership of the Russian Federation will not risk
the lives of sailors to try to take control of the waters near this
island.’
Source: https://www.bbc.com/
‘Cancellation of the Ukrainian grain deal would mean the naval blockade of Odessa and the preparation for its potential assault,’ political scientist and former premier of the Lugansk People’s Republic, Marat Bashirov, noted a few days ago in the Telegram channel. The establishment of control over Odessa as one of the potential targets of the Russian operation is also mentioned by Western experts.
At the end of September, the US publication, National Interest, commented in predicting a possible Russian response to the advance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kharkov region: ‘Moscow may launch a counteroffensive, focusing on the capture of the Black Sea port of Odessa. This city is the last exit of Ukraine to the Black Sea, and its capture would actually turn the Ukraine into a fully landlocked country. It will also give Russia a stranglehold over Ukraine’s main and vital economic outlet, because most of Kiev’s exports and imports pass through Odessa. The loss of this city would be a colossal economic and psychological blow for Ukraine.’ According to the National Interest, ‘given that Russia has transferred a significant number of troops and weapons from the east of Ukraine to the south, even before Kiev’s offensive in the east,’ there is a high probability that Odessa is now the main target of the Russian Armed Forces.
HOW THE BOMB WAS TRANSPORTED BY ROAD AND TRUCK TO THE BRIDGE
Source: https://vz.ru/
Ukrainian terror came to Russia through Estonia and Armenia
The moment of detention of one of the suspects in the preparation of terrorist attacks on the territory of Russia
October 12, 2022.
By Evgeny Krutikov
With unusual speed the FSB of Russia has revealed the picture of who
delivered the explosives that eventually worked on the Crimean Bridge,
and how. A lot of people participated in the covert operation, and it
was managed by the military intelligence agency of Ukraine. Why did all
this become possible and how did the explosives easily slip over several
borders at once, including the Russian one?
The FSB has
announced the detention of five citizens of Russia plus three citizens
of Ukraine and Armenia as part of the investigation into the terrorist
attack on the Crimean Bridge. The organizer of this crime is called the
Ukrainian military intelligence. The FSB stated that “the organizer of
the terrorist attack on the Crimean Bridge was the Main Intelligence
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, its head Kirill
Budanov, employees and agents.”
Also on Wednesday, it was
reported about the detention in the Bryansk region of a Ukrainian agent
who was going to detonate an explosive device at one of the logistics
terminals. Another saboteur was detained in the Moscow region with two
portable Igla anti-aircraft complexes. Both of them entered the
territory of Russia through Estonia; the weapons and explosives were
unearthed in caches in the border regions.
According to the
investigation, the explosive device which went off in a truck on the
Crimean Bridge was camouflaged in rolls under construction plastic film
on 22 pallets with a total weight of 22,770 kg. In early August this was
sent from the seaport of Odessa to the Bulgarian city of Ruse under
contract No. 02/08/2022 between LLC Translogistic UA (Kiev) and Baltex
Capital S.A.
The Bulgarian city of Ruse is located not on the
Black Sea, but on the Bulgarian bank of the Danube River in the interior
of the country. Consequently, the ship, which left Odessa for Ruse,
moved on a coastal course along the seashore, and then entered the
Danube. Thus, it was not subject to verification by Turkish observers as
part of the ‘grain deal’.
And then the cargo was delivered from
Bulgaria to [Poti] Georgia by sea in transit for Armenia. That is, it
was sealed and was not subject to Bulgarian or Georgian customs
inspection. This is a “gray” scheme, according to which contraband is
usually smuggled.
“Citizens of Ukraine Mikhail Vladimirovich Tsyurkalo, born in 1975, Denis Olegovich Kovach, born in 1979, Roman Ivanovich Solomko, born in 1971; citizens of Georgia Inosaridze Sandro, a broker named Levan, and a citizen of Armenia Arthur Terchanyan, born in 1985, were involved in organizing the shipment of cargo from Bulgaria to the port of Poti (Georgia), and then to Armenia. From September 29 to October 3, 2022, in Yerevan, at the Transalliance terminal, the cargo was cleared according to the rules of the EEC [Eurasian Economic Commission] and documents were substituted, after which its new consignor became GU AR JI GROUP LLC (Republic of Armenia, Alaverdi city), and the recorded consignee became Leader LLC (Moscow city), according to the FSB report.
Source: https://t.me/boris_rozhin/
However, the cargo did not reach Moscow. On October 4, the cargo crossed the Russian-Georgian border at the Upper Lars checkpoint on a DAF truck registered in Georgia and was unloaded at the Armavir wholesale base of the Krasnodar Territory on October 6.
It should also be noted here that the cargo had already been customs cleared according to the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC)
rules in Yerevan, and therefore it was not subject to additional
customs inspection at the Russian border. By the way, the Georgian side
has already managed to disown what had been happening, declaring that
‘no cargo with explosives crossed the Georgian customs border.’
Formally, this is true, since the cargo had already been cleared in
Yerevan according to the rules of the EEC, and had nothing to do with
the Georgian customs border. To be clear: the customs border is
different from the physical one. For transit goods going from one EEC
country [Armenia] to another [Russia] through the territory of a country
that is not a member of this union [Georgia], it is as if they do not
cross the customs space of this transit jurisdiction.
A reproduction photo of the truck cargo and copies of the EEC customs declarations released by the FSB.
In Armavir, the cargo was received by a local company Agro Service, engaged in the cultivation of soybeans. This is a family business, which has been owned by the Azatian family for more than 20 years – the head of the family Samvel and his children — the elder George and the younger Artem. All of them are natives of the city of Makeyevka, Donetsk People’s Republic, who moved to Krasnodar Krai a long time ago.
Samvel the father and oldest son George are mainly engaged in the
affairs of their soy business. The youngest, Artem, studied to be a
lawyer, but he did not find a place for himself in Armavir and some time
ago went to live in the Crimea. To Simferopol to work. It was Artem
Azatian who called his father from Crimea on the eve of the terrorist
attack and asked him to help some friend of his. The friend had asked
him to hold a cargo in his warehouse for literally a day, for which
another truck would then come from Krasnodar to collect it. The elder
brother George was not sleep-walking but he was very surprised when a
truck with foreign (Georgian) license plates drove up to his warehouse.
“The
driver handed me a stack of invoices to sign, but I gave them back to
him. Why should I read and sign other people’s documents? Father and
brother agreed, I helped,” he explained. This is a normal story for the
North Caucasus.
George Azatian and a company worker, tractor
driver Yuri Postnikov, organized the unloading of pallets from the
Georgian truck using a forklift. During the investigation, the FSB took
Postnikov’s work gloves in which he had worked on the unloading and
reloading. Apparently, the investigation hopes to find traces of
explosives on them. But this is unlikely. In the evening of the same
day, an Inter company truck from Krasnodar stopped by the warehouse,
where the pallets were loaded.
Where did the Inter truck come from, which eventually exploded on the Crimean Bridge?
There
is an electronic freight exchange in Russia, ATI.SU, created by one IT
company. The exchange’s head office is located in St. Petersburg. It has
been operating for more than 20 years, it is a respected structure that
is used in 60 countries. It works like this. You need to transport
cargo from point A to point B. You don’t have your own trucks or other
means of delivery. Then you place an ad-request on this exchange with an
indication of the route and the desired dates of loading / unloading.
You are contacted by independent carriers, of which there are a dime a
dozen in the country: people buy a vehicle (often a truck) or some other
cargo vehicle and earn money on it.
You choose the carrier you
like and enter into an electronic contract with him. There is a feedback
system and reviews about customers and carriers. Very often, this
exchange is also used by large regional transport aggregator companies
which receive a certain order in a region where at that time they don’t
have their own vehicles. A convenient thing.
This system is
similar to the one called bareboat charter in seaborne shipping. This
is when the customer hires just the vessel without a crew for cargo
transportation. Then the captain is hired, and he hires the crew. At the
same time, it is only known that it is necessary to transport cargo
from point A to point B, but what kind of cargo it is – even the captain
does not necessarily know this. And often he doesn’t want to know.
In
the case of an electronic transportation exchange, the driver also does
not know what he is carrying. That is, in theory, he should know.
Because he has the invoices and all other documents, but in reality the
driver sees only bags or boxes. Freight forwarders usually do not look
into the cargo. Another feature of such a system — carriers often do not
deal with the actual manufacturer of the cargo, but with intermediaries
or stockists detached from the sale and purchase deal. In our case,
such intermediaries unwittingly turned out to be Samvel and Georgy
Azatian who had been asked in a fraternal way to hold someone else’s
cargo in their wholesale warehouse for a day.
At the height of
the bombing of aircraft by various Palestinian groups in the 1970s and
1980s, airports expressly announced: do not take other people’s
belongings or parcels with you on board. By the end of the 1980s and in
the 1990s, such memos were already distributed in the USSR, and then in
Russia. But how can you refuse a loved one?
And on the eve of the
terrorist attack, an offer appeared on this electronic freight exchange
from a certain transport company from Ulyanovsk ‘TEK-34’ to transport
cargo from Armavir to Simferopol. A non-existent company was indicated
as the recipient of the cargo in Crimea. The fact that it does not
exist, this turned out much later.
The TEK-34 company was
registered in the Volgograd region by a citizen of the Russian
Federation Alexei Orlov, but it last showed signs of life in 2018. Then
it was bought out in 2020 by Oleg Antipov, a resident of Ulyanovsk, on
whose behalf the announcement was placed on the electronic exchange.
Antipov has not been detained and is actively cooperating with the
investigation. He claims that he was framed and ‘his conscience is
clear.’
And it was like this. ‘On October 7 of this year, with
the assistance of Roman Solomko, a citizen of Ukraine, Vladimir
Vasilyevich Zloba, born in 1987, and five other resident citizens of
Russia, the documents for the cargo were changed again, the sender
indicated LLC TEK-34 (Ulyanovsk), and the recipient was a non–existent
company in the Republic of Crimea,’ the FSB reports.
That is,
professional hackers hacked the website of the TEK-34 company and placed
an ad on the electronic transportation exchange on behalf of Oleg
Antipov.
A private trucker named Mahir Yusubov, born in 1971, a
resident of Krasnodar, responded to the ad. The vehicle, of the same
Inter company, was recently re–registered to his own nephew, 25–year-old
Samir Yusubov, who is currently abroad.
The fact is that trucker
Mahir Yusubov got into an accident somewhere near Kazan some time ago
and he has remained in debt to someone. To keep himself out of harm’s
way, Yusubov says he re-registered the truck to his nephew so that his
creditors wouldn’t take it away. If they would come, they would find he
has nothing. That is why at first the initial suspect was the young
Samir Yusubov, although the driver of the truck, 51-year-old Mahir,
clearly visible on the video at the checkpoint at the Crimean Bridge,
did not even look like the young and athletic Samir in body build. A few
days later, Samir Saimur ogli Yusubov officially stated that he had
nothing to do with the incident.
The owners of the Armavir warehouse, the Azatian family, and trucker
Mahir Yusubov did not contact each other in any way. The Azatians only
knew the number of the truck which would come to pick up the cargo. Also
out of the scheme is the Georgian trucker who delivered the cargo
across the Russian border to Armavir. Armenian soybean producers, a
poor Azerbaijani trucker, and a Georgian driver are the entire Caucasian
international that was remotely manipulated by Ukrainian military
intelligence.
For all of the eight hours that Mahir Yusubov drove
his truck from Armavir towards the Crimea, he was constantly contacted
by a Ukrainian intelligence officer who called himself Ivan Ivanovich.
For communication, an anonymous electronic number purchased on the
Internet was used, as well as a real phone number registered to a
citizen of Ukraine, a resident of Kremenchuk, Sergei Vladimirovich
Andreichenko, born in 1988.
Most of the people involved in the
scheme were used by Ukrainian intelligence and kept in the dark.
Nevertheless, the investigators emphasize that their investigation of
the terrorist attack continues. All of its organizers and accomplices,
they say, ‘including foreign citizens, will be brought to justice in
accordance with Russian law.’
There is reason to believe that now
the greatest interest for the investigation is the ‘acquaintance’ of
Artem Azatian, who ‘asked in a brotherly way’ to hold the cargo in his
family’s warehouse in Armavir. Why the Ukrainians needed him, it is now
clear. A truck with Georgian license plates at the checkpoint of the
Crimean Bridge would not just be inspected – it would be taken apart
down to the nuts and bolts. That would have been so even early on a
Saturday morning. And so here was a local trucker, his own truck,
Krasnodar plates. To be sure, the unfortunate Mahir Yusubov had
repeatedly traveled across the bridge to the Crimea before.
The
“acquaintance” of Azatian Jr. could well have been formed on the basis
of a common origin – remember that the Azatian family came from
Makeyevka, Donetsk — or a childhood or teenage acquaintance. This method
has been used by Ukrainian intelligence for many years. A person is
approached by his childhood friends, classmates. Even quite sane people
can be deceived by such nostalgia.
The Ukrainian scheme used
numerous loopholes, not only in the organizational system of cargo
transportation, but also in the legislation and even in the
international agreements. The cargo was sent to Bulgaria by the Danube
River, not by sea. Georgia is a smuggler’s paradise, where all kinds of
brokers have been working for years with entrances and exits around the
ports of Poti and Batumi. Russian customs and border guards cannot
control how goods and cargo are cleared in Yerevan. After the Armenian
customs clearance, the goods become free to move throughout the Eurasian
Economic Commission area.
Yes, such operations are costly,
since the cargo set sail and then traveled for a month. They are risky,
because anything could go wrong at any moment. The more people who
participate in the scheme, especially when they are in the dark, the
greater the chance of failure. The forklift driver Postnikov could have
made a mistake when he was working on the loading in the warehouse – if
he had dropped the very pallet where the fuse was, half of Armavir
would have blown up.
Another point is that preliminary
intelligence work had been carried out. Someone had to find out that
Artem Azatian had a father and an older brother, and they have a
warehouse in Armavir. The rest is not so difficult, although it requires
clever planning. If we assume that the truck from Yerevan to the
Crimean Bridge was remotely controlled by one employee of the Ukrainian
special services (the notorious ‘Ivan Ivanovich’), then everything is
quite simple.
It’s this simplicity which is frightening – for
example, both of the Ukrainian terrorists who were detained on Wednesday
after they crossed the Russian border from Estonia; and the one with
the MANPADS who drove the rockets in his car. The Estonian border raises
questions. It is worth recalling that [Natalia] Vovk, the Ukrainian
citizen who is suspected of the murder of Daria Dugina, also fled from
the Russian Federation to Estonia.
The detention of a Ukrainian
terrorist with anti–aircraft missiles in the Moscow region is a separate
story. He wanted to hit something or someone. If we are talking about
passenger planes, then this is obviously the preparation of an act of
international terrorism. Given these many alarming signals, it can be
assumed that there may be more such groups or lone terrorists. They are
controlled from a single center (GUR MO of Ukraine); they are dangerous
because they are hard-bitten, relentless.
The main method for
dealing with them is agent intelligence, as well as unwinding
communication chains. Closing the Estonian border or normalizing customs
relations are more political than counterintelligence actions.
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