Tomgram: Peter Van Buren, In the Middle East, Bet on a Winner (Iran!)
Think of it as the American half-century in the Middle East: from August 17, 1953, when a CIA oil coup
brought down democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad
Mosaddegh and installed the Shah as Washington’s man in Tehran, to May
1, 2003, when George W. Bush landed on the USS Abraham Lincoln off the
coast of southern California. (The planes from that aircraft carrier
had only recently dropped 1.6 million pounds of ordnance on Iraq.) There, standing under a White House-produced banner that read “Mission Accomplished,” the president dramatically announced that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended” and hailed “the arrival of a new era.”
Today, we know that those combat operations had barely begun. Almost 12 years later, with the Obama administration pursuing a bombing campaign
in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State, they have yet to end. On
only one thing was President Bush right: with the invasion of Iraq, a
new era had indeed been launched. His top officials and their
neoconservative allies imagined
the moment as the coronation of a new order in the Middle East, the
guarantee of another American half-century or more of domination. Iraq,
that crucial state in the oil heartlands of the planet, was to be
garrisoned for decades (on the “Korea model”);
the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad was to be brought to heel; and
above all, fundamentalist Iran was to be crushed. That country’s rulers
were to find themselves in an ever-tightening geopolitical vise, with
American Iraq on one side and American Afghanistan on the other. (A quip
of the moment caught the mood of Washington and its high-flown hopes
perfectly: “Everyone wants to go to Baghdad. Real men want to go to
Tehran.”) The Bush administration would ensure that the great blemish
on the American half-century in the region, the reversal of the CIA’s
coup by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 and the humiliation of having
American diplomats taken hostage for 444 days in Tehran -- would be wiped away. The regime of the Ayatollahs was soon to be history.
Of
course, it all turned out so unimaginably otherwise, leaving us today
knee-deep in the chaos of that "new era." Shock and awe, indeed! The
American half-century has been swept away as definitively as was the
Soviet Cold-War version of the same before it. Someday, the disastrous
invasion of Iraq will have its historian and we’ll understand more fully
just what that moment really launched, what forces already building in
the region it let devastatingly loose. It certainly blew a hole
in the heart of the Middle East in ways we have yet to come to grips
with and prepared the ground, as dynamite does a construction site, for
the disintegration of both the European and the American versions of
“order” in the region, as well as for the building of we know not
what... yet.
Today, amid remarkable fragmentation,
roiling conflict, sectarian struggles, the growth and spread of
extremist groups, and the creation of one failed state after another,
including Syria, Iraq, Libya,
and Yemen, two key energy states still remain in place: Saudi Arabia
and Iran. And the Saudis, a repressive Sunni kingdom with a restive
Shia minority population whose rulers have used the country’s immense
oil wealth to buy social peace, are visibly nervous. Hence, their
decision to begin a terror-bombing campaign in disintegrating Yemen, with the threat of a ground invasion (possibly involving Egyptian
and other troops) to follow. As the Americans have already shown, far
more “precise” bombing than the Saudi air force is capable of has a
history of not resolving, or even further stoking, conflicts. Just what
kind of blowback the Saudis will experience from their rash decision to
strike in Yemen is impossible to know, but it’s not hard to guess that,
as with Washington’s drive through “the gates of hell” in Iraq in 2003, it’s unlikely to be whatever that country’s rulers are now imagining.
Keep
in mind that the destabilization of Saudi Arabia in any fashion would
be a daunting prospect in the Middle East and, given its key role in oil
production, globally as well. As for Iran, like the cheese of nursery rhyme fame, today it stands alone. TomDispatch regular Peter Van Buren (who, as a State Department official, lived through
the beginnings of Bush’s “new era” in occupied Iraq) suggests that in
the coming years it may prove to be the single cohesive nation in the
neighborhood. So, whatever we don’t know about the future of the Middle
East, it’s certainly not too early to say, “Mission Accomplished,” and
congratulate George W. on his new era. Tom
The Iranian Ascendancy: Twelve Years Later, We Know the Winner in Iraq: Iran
by Peter Van Buren
Today's News -- and Some History
The U.S. recently concluded
air strikes in support of the Iraqi militias that Iran favors as they took back the city of Tikrit from the Islamic State (IS). At the same time, Washington began supplying
intelligence and
aerial refueling on demand for a Saudi bombing campaign against the militias Iran favors in Yemen. Iran continues to advise and assist Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whom Washington would still like to depose and, as part of its Syrian strategy, continues to supply and direct Hezbollah in Lebanon, a group the U.S. considers a terror outfit.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has successfully
negotiated the outlines of an agreement with Iran in which progress on severely constricting its nuclear program would be traded for an eventual lifting of sanctions and the granting of diplomatic recognition. This is sure to further bolster Tehran's status as a regional power, while weakening long-time American allies Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States.
A clever pundit could undoubtedly paint all of the above as a
realpolitik ballet on Washington's part, but the truth seems so much simpler and more painful. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, U.S. policy in the region has combined confusion on an immense scale with awkward bursts of ill-coordinated and exceedingly short-term acts of expediency. The country that has most benefited is Iran. No place illustrates this better than Iraq.
Iraq Redux (Yet Again)
On April 9, 2003, just over 12 years ago, U.S. troops pulled down a statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad's
Firdos Square, symbolically marking what George W. Bush hoped was the beginning of a campaign to remake the Middle East in America's image by bringing not just Iraq but Syria and Iran to heel. And there can be no question that the invasion of Iraq did indeed set events in motion that are still remaking the region in ways once unimaginable.
In the wake of the Iraq invasion and occupation, the Arab Spring blossomed and
failed. (The recent Obama administration decision to resume arms exports to the military government of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt could be considered its coup de grâce.) Today, fighting ripples through Libya, Syria, Yemen, the Maghreb, the
Horn of Africa, and other parts of the Greater Middle East. Terrorists attack in once relatively peaceful places like
Tunisia. There is now a de facto independent Kurdistan -- last a reality in the sixteenth century -- that includes the city of Kirkuk. Previously stable countries have become roiling failed states and home to terrorist groups that didn’t even exist when the U.S. military rolled across the Iraqi border in 2003.
And, of course, 12 years later in Iraq itself the fighting roars on. Who now remembers President Obama declaring victory in 2011 and praising American troops for coming home with their “
heads held high”? He seemed then to be washing his hands forever of the pile of sticky brown sand that was Bush's Iraq. Trillions had been spent, untold lives lost or ruined, but as with Vietnam decades earlier, the U.S. was to move on and not look back. So much for the dream of a successful Pax Americana in the Middle East, but at least it was all over.
You know what happened next. Unlike in Vietnam, Washington did go back, quickly turning a humanitarian gesture in August 2014 to
save the
Yazidi people from destruction at the hands of the Islamic State into a full-scale bombing campaign in Syria and Iraq. A coalition of
62 nations was formed. (Where are they all now while the U.S. conducts
85% of all air strikes against IS?) The tap on a massive
arms flow was turned on. The architect of the 2007 “
surge” in Iraq and a
leaker of top secret documents, retired general and former CIA Director David Petraeus, was brought back in for advice. Twenty-four-seven bombing became the order of the day and several thousand U.S. military advisors returned to
familiar bases to retrain some part of an American-created army that had only recently collapsed and abandoned
four key northern cities to Islamic State militants. Iraq War 3.0 was officially underway and many pundits --
including me -- predicted a steady escalation with the usual quagmire to follow.
Such a result can hardly be ruled out yet, but at the moment it’s as if Barack Obama had stepped to the edge of the Iraqi abyss, peered over, and then shrugged his shoulders. Both his administration and the U.S. military appear content for the moment neither to pull back nor press harder.
The American people seem to feel much the same way. Except in the Republican Congress (and even there in less shrill form than usual), there are few calls for… well, anything. The ongoing air strikes remain “surgical” in domestic politics, if not in Iraq and Syria. Hardly noticed and little reported on here, they have had next to no effect on Americans. Yet they remain sufficient to assure the right wing that the American military is still the best tool to solve problems abroad, while encouraging liberals who want to show that they can be as tough as anyone going into 2016.
At first glance, the American version of Iraq War 3.0 has the feel of the
Libyan air intervention -- the same lack of concern, that is, for the long game. But Iraq 2015 is no Libya 2011, because this time while America sits back, Iran rises.
Iran Ascendant
The Middle East was ripe for change. Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the last major transformational event in the area was the
fall of that classic American stooge, the Shah of Iran, in 1979. Otherwise, many of the thug regimes in power since the 1960s, the height of the Cold War, had stayed in place, and so had most of the borders set even earlier, in the
aftermath of World War I.
Iran should send America a fruit basket to thank it for setting the stage so perfectly for its ascent. As a start, in 2003 the United States eliminated Iran's major border threats: Iraq’s Saddam Hussein to the west and the Taliban in Afghanistan to the east. (The Taliban are back of course, but diligently focused on America's puppet Afghan government.) The long slog of Washington’s wars in both those countries dulled even the reliably bloodthirsty American public’s taste for yet more of the same, and cooled off Bush-era plans in Tel Aviv and Washington for air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. (After all, if even Vice President Dick Cheney couldn’t pull the trigger on Iran before leaving office in 2008, who in 2015 America is going to do so?)
Better yet for the Iranians, when Saddam was
hanged in 2006, they not only lost an enemy who had invaded their country in 1980, launching a bitter
war against them that didn’t end for eight years, but gained an ally in the new Iraq. As U.S. influence
withered away with the failure of the March 2010 Iraqi elections to produce a broadly representative government, Iran stepped in to broker a thoroughly partisan settlement leading to a sectarian Shia government in Baghdad bent on ensuring that the country’s minority Sunni population would remain out of power forever. The Obama administration seemed nearly oblivious to Iran's gains in Iraq in 2010 -- and seems so again in 2015.
Iran in Iraq
In Tikrit, Iranian-led Shia forces recently drove the Islamic State from the city. In charge was Qassem Suleimani, the leader of the
Qods Force (a unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guards), who had previously
led the brutally effective efforts of Iranian special forces against U.S. soldiers in Iraq War 2.0. He returned to that country and assembled his own coalition of Shia militias to take Tikrit. All of them have long benefited from Iranian support, as has the increasingly Shia-dominated Iraqi army.
In addition, the Iranians seem to have brought in their own
tanks and possibly even
ground troops for the assault on the city. They also moved
advanced rocket systems into Iraq, the same weapons Hamas has used against Israel in recent conflicts.
Only one thing was lacking: air power. After
much hemming and hawing, when it looked like the assault on Tikrit had been blunted by well-dug-in Islamic State fighters in a heavily booby-trapped city, the Obama administration agreed to provide it.
On the U.S. side, the air of desperation around the decision to launch air strikes on Tikrit was palpable. You could feel it, for instance, in this statement by a Pentagon spokesperson almost pleading for the Iraqi government to favor Washington over Tehran: "I think it's important that the Iraqis understand that what would be most helpful to them is a reliable partner in this fight against IS. Reliable, professional, advanced military capabilities are something that very clearly and very squarely reside with the coalition."
Imagine if you had told an American soldier -- or general -- leaving Iraq in 2011 that, just a few years later in the country where he or she had watched friends die, the U.S. would be serving as Iran's close air support. Imagine if you had told him that Washington would be helping some of the same Shia militias who planted IEDs to kill Americans go after Sunnis -- and essentially begging for the chance to do so. Who would've thunk it?
The Limits of Air Power 101
The White House no doubt
imagined that U.S. bombs would be seen as the decisive factor in Tikrit and that the sectarian government in Baghdad would naturally come to… What? Like us better than the Iranians?
Bizarre as such a “strategy” might seem on the face of it, it has proven even stranger in practice. The biggest problem with air power is that, while it’s good at breaking things, it isn't decisive. It cannot determine who moves into the governor's mansion after the dust settles. Only ground forces can do that, so a victory over the Islamic State in Tikrit, no matter what role air strikes played, can only further empower those Iranian-backed Shia militias. You don’t have to be a military expert to know that this is the nature of air power, which makes it all the more surprising that American strategists seem so blind to it.
As for liking Washington better for its helping hand, there are few signs of that. Baghdad officials have largely been silent on America's contribution, praising only the “air coverage of the Iraqi air force and the international coalition.” Shia militia forces on the ground have been angered by and scornful of the United States for -- as they see it --
interfering in their efforts to take Tikrit on their own.
The victory in that city will only increase the government’s reliance on the militias, whom Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi now
refers to as “popular volunteers,” rather than the still-limited number of soldiers the Americans have so far been capable of training. (The Pentagon might, by the way, want to see if Iran can pass along any training tips, as their militias, unlike the American-backed Iraqi army, seem to be doing just fine.) That also means that the government will have no choice but to tolerate the Shia militia
atrocities and acts of
ethnic cleansing that have already
taken place in Sunni Tikrit and will surely follow in any other Sunni areas similarly “liberated.” Claims coming out of Washington that the U.S. will be carefully monitoring the acts of Iraqi forces ring increasingly hollow.
What Tikrit has, in fact, done is solidify Iran’s
influence over Prime Minister al-Abadi, currently little more than the acting mayor of Baghdad, who
claimed the victory in Tikrit as a way to increase his own prestige. The win also allows his Shia-run government to seize control of the ruins of that previously Sunni enclave. And no one should miss the obvious symbolism that lies in the fact that the first major city retaken from the Islamic State in a Sunni area is also the birthplace of Saddam Hussein.
The best the Obama administration can do is watch helplessly as Tehran and Baghdad take their
bows. A template has been created for a future in which other Sunni areas, including the country’s second largest city, Mosul, and Sunni cities in Anbar Province will be similarly retaken, perhaps with the help of American air power but almost certainly with little credit to Washington.
Iran in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen
Tehran is now playing a similarly important role in other places where U.S. policy stumbles have left voids, particularly in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.
In Syria, Iranian forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Qods Force, and their intelligence services,
advise and assist Bashar al-Assad’s military. They also support Hezbollah elements from Lebanon fighting on Assad's side. At best, Washington is again playing second fiddle, using its air power against the Islamic State and training “moderate” Syrian fighters, the first of whom
refused to even show up for their initial battle.
In Yemen, a U.S.-supported regime, backed by Special Forces advisers and a full-scale drone targeted assassination campaign, recently crumbled. The American Embassy was evacuated in February, the last of those advisers in March. The takeover of the capital, Sana'a, and later significant parts of the rest of the country by the Houthis, a rebel Shiite minority group, represents, in the words of one Foreign Policy
writer, “a huge victory for Iran... the Houthis’ decision to tie their fate to Tehran's regional machinations risks tearing Yemen apart and throwing the country into chaos.”
The panicked Saudis promptly
intervened and were quickly
backed by the Obama administration's insertion of the United States in yet another conflict by executive order. Relentless Saudi air strikes (perhaps using some of the
$640 million worth of cluster bombs the U.S. sold them last year) are
supported by yet another coalition, this time of Sudan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and other Sunni powers in the region. The threat of an invasion, possibly using
Egyptian troops, looms. The Iranians have
moved ships into the area in response to a Saudi naval blockade of Yemen.
No matter what happens, Iran will be strengthened. Either it will find itself in a client relationship with a Houthi movement that has advanced to the Saudi border or, should they be driven back, a
chaotic state in Yemen with an ever-strengthening al-Qaeda offshoot. Either outcome would undoubtedly discombobulate the Saudis (and the Americans) and so sit well with Iran.
To make things even livelier in a fragmenting region, Sunni rebels infiltrating from neighboring Pakistan recently
killed eight Iranian border guards. This probably represented a retaliatory attack in response to an earlier skirmish in which Iranian Revolutionary Guards killed three suspected Pakistani Sunni militants. Once started, fires do tend to spread.
For those keeping score at home, the Iranians now hold significant positions in three Middle Eastern countries (or at least fragments of former countries) in addition to Iraq.
Iran Ascending and the Nuclear Question
Iran is well positioned to ascend. Geopolitically, alone in the region it is a nation that has existed more or less within its current borders for thousands of years. It is almost completely ethnically stable and religiously, culturally, and linguistically homogeneous, with its minorities comparatively under
control. While still governed in large part by its clerics, Iran has seen evolving democratic electoral transitions at the secular level. Politically, history is on Iran's side. If you set aside the 1953
CIA-backed coup that ousted the democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and put the U.S.-backed Shah in power for a quarter of a century, Iran has sorted out its governance on its own for some time.
Somehow, despite decades of sanctions, Iran, with the
fourth-largest proven crude oil reserves and the second-largest natural gas reserves on the planet, has managed to hold its economy together, selling what oil it can primarily to
Asia. It is ready to sell more oil as soon as sanctions lift. It has a decent conventional military by local standards. Its young reportedly
yearn for greater engagement with the West. Unlike nearly every other nation in the Middle East, Iran's leaders do not rule in fear of an Islamic revolution. They already had one -- 36 years ago.
Recently, the U.S., Iran, and the P5 (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China) reached a preliminary agreement to significantly constrain that country’s nuclear program and lift sanctions. It appears that both the Obama administration and Tehran are eager to turn it into an official document by the end of June. A deal isn't a deal until signed on the dotted line, and the congressional Republicans are sharpening their knives, but the intent is clearly there.
To keep the talks on track, by the end of June the Obama administration will have released to the Islamic Republic a total of
$11.9 billion in previously frozen assets, dating back to the 1979 Iranian takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. In addition to the straight-up flood of cash, the U.S. agreed that Iran may sell $4.2 billion worth of oil, free from any sanctions. The U.S. will also allow Iran approximately $1.5 billion in gold sales, as well as easier access to “humanitarian transactions.” Put another way, someone in Washington wanted this badly enough to pay for it.
For President Obama and his advisers, this agreement is clearly a late grasp (or perhaps last gasp) at legacy building, and maybe even a guilty stab at justifying that 2009 Nobel Peace Prize. The urge to etch some kind of foreign policy success into future history books that, at the moment, threaten to be grim reading is easy enough to understand. So it should have surprised no one that John Kerry, Obama's once
globetrotting secretary of state, basically took up residence in Switzerland to negotiate with the Iranians. He sat at the table in Lausanne bargaining while Tikrit burned, Syria simmered, his country was chased out of Yemen, and the Saudis launched their own war in that beleaguered country. That he had hardly a word to say about any of those events, or much of anything else going on in the world at the time, is an indication of just how much value the Obama administration puts on those nuclear negotiations.
For the Iranians, trading progress on developing nuclear weapons for the full-scale lifting of sanctions was an attractive offer. After all, its leaders know that the country could never go fully nuclear without ensuring devastating Israeli strikes, and so lost little with the present agreement while gaining much. Being accepted as a peer by Washington in such negotiations only further establishes their country’s status as a regional power. Moreover, a nuclear agreement that widens any rift between the U.S., Israel, and the Saudis plays to Tehran's new strength. Finally, the stronger economy likely to blossom once sanctions are lifted will offer the nation the possibility of new revenues and renewed foreign investment. (It’s easy to imagine Chinese businesspeople on Orbitz making air reservations as you read this.) The big winner in the nuclear deal is not difficult to suss out.
What Lies Ahead
In these last months, despite the angry, fearful cries and demands of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Saudi royals, and
neo- and other conservatives in Congress, Iran has shown few signs of aspiring to the sort of self-destruction going nuclear would entail. (If Iran had created a bomb every time Netanyahu claimed they were on the verge of having one in the past two decades, Tehran would be littered with them.) In fact, trading mushroom clouds with Israel and possibly the U.S. never looked like an appealing goal to the Iranian leadership. Instead, they preferred to seek a more conventional kind of influence throughout the Middle East. They were hardly alone in that, but their success has been singular in the region in these years.
The U.S. provided free tutorials in Afghanistan and Iraq on why actually occupying territory in the neighborhood isn’t the road to such influence. Iran’s leaders have not ignored the advice. Instead, Iran’s rise has been stoked by a collection of client states, aligned governments, sympathetic and/or beholden militias, and -- when all else fails -- chaotic non-states that promise less trouble and harm to Tehran than to its various potential enemies.
Despite Iran's gains, the U.S. will still be the biggest kid on the block for years, possibly decades, to come. One hopes that America will not use that military and economic strength to lash out at the new regional power it inadvertently helped midwife. And if any of this does presage some future U.S. conflict with an Iran that has gotten “too powerful,” then we shall have witnessed a great irony, a great tragedy, and a damn waste of American blood and resources.
Peter Van Buren blew the whistle on State Department waste and mismanagement during the Iraqi reconstruction in his first book, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People. A Tom Dispatch regular, he writes about current events at his blog, We Meant Well. His latest book is Ghosts of Tom Joad: A Story of the #99Percent.
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Copyright 2015 Peter Van Buren
